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Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the
States: A Logical, Textual, and Historical Account
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS*
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment is logically and textually impossible—so say most
academics, a few lower-court judges, and a Supreme Court Justice. They maintain
that because the Clause was originally understood as a structural limitation that
protected state power against the federal government, it cannot restrain state
power or fit within the Fourteenth Amendment texts that protect personal rights—
indeed, that attempts to show that it does are laughable.
This purported incoherence and textual inconsistency enable anti-incorporation
critics to avoid serious engagement of the anti-establishment dimensions of
Reconstruction history. They also undermine the Clause’s vigorous application
against the states and place the Court’s anti-establishment decisions under a cloud
of illegitimacy.
This Article sets forth logical, textual, and historical justifications for
Establishment Clause incorporation based on the original eighteenth-century
understanding of the Clause as a purely structural limitation on federal power. By
its terms, the Establishment Clause did not reserve state power but disabled
congressional action. As an express disability on Congress, the Clause generated
two immunities, one held by the states against congressional interference with state
decisions about religious establishment or disestablishment, and one held by the
people against congressional establishment of a national religion.
As part of Reconstruction’s imposition of new federal limits on state power, the
Fourteenth Amendment extinguished the state immunity from federal interference
but extended the personal immunity to protect the people against state as well as
federally established religions. This is logically coherent in the context of
Reconstruction’s goals and also sounds in the personal liberty and citizen
immunities protected by the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. When framed by a
logical and textual account of Establishment Clause incorporation, Reconstruction
history suggests an originalist account of the Fourteenth Amendment’s application
of the Establishment Clause to the states.

† Copyright © 2013 Frederick Mark Gedicks.
* Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School;
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Incorporation of the Establishment Clause, therefore, is not laughable but
eminently defensible. Its justifications require more careful consideration by courts
and commentators than they have yet received.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1947, with little apparent forethought,1 the U.S. Supreme Court incorporated
the Establishment Clause against the states as a dimension of the personal liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Scholarly
attacks arose almost immediately,3 and have not abated;4 recently they picked up an

1. See infra Part I.A.
2. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3. See J.M. O’NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION ch. 10
(1949); Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 Law &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1949); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 371 (1954).
4. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309–10 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 33–35 (1998); GERARD V. BRADLEY,
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 9–10, 95–96 (1987); DANIEL L. DREISBACH,
REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW 89–96 (1987); WILBER G. KATZ, RELIGION AND
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 8–11 (1964); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 21–25,
49–54 (1995) [hereinafter SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE]; Jonathan P. Brose, In
Birmingham They Love the Governor: Why the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not
Incorporate the Establishment Clause, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Daniel O. Conkle,
Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1135–42
(1988); Richard F. Duncan, Justice Thomas and Partial Incorporation of the Establishment
Clause: Herein of Structural Limitations, Liberty Interests, and Taking Incorporation
Seriously, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 37 (2007); Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural
Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 479–82 (1991); James J. Knicely, “First Principles”
and the Misplacement of the “Wall of Separation”: Too Late in the Day for a Cure?, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 171 (2004); Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The
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enthusiastic cheerleader in Justice Thomas.5 Defenders, meanwhile, have been
few.6
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 9–11
(1979); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the
Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (1990); James McClellan, The Making
and the Unmaking of the Establishment Clause, in A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL REFORM 295,
314–19 (Patrick B. McGuigan & Randall R. Rader eds., 1981); Luke Meier, Constitutional
Structure, Individual Rights, and the Pledge of Allegiance, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 162
(2006); Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the
Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585 (2006); Michael A. Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 317–26 (1986); William C. Porth &
Robert P. George, Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment
Clause, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 138–39 (1987); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of
the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1060 (2011); Rupal M. Doshi, Note,
Nonincorporation of the Establishment Clause: Satisfying the Demands of Equality,
Pluralism, and Originalism, 98 GEO. L.J. 459 (2010); Russell A. Hilton, Note, The Case for
the Selective Disincorporation of the Establishment Clause: Is Everson a Super-Precedent?,
56 EMORY L.J. 1701 (2007); Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Note, The Historical Meaning and
Judicial Construction of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, 2
WASHBURN L.J. 65, 110–15, 126–33 (1962); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the
Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700 (1992) [hereinafter Note,
Rethinking Incorporation]; see also Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a
Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 25–27 (1998) (arguing that
“the Court had to strain in order to squeeze a structural clause into a ‘liberty’ mold”).
A few lower courts have questioned the Clause’s application to the states, though
obviously such opinions do not survive appellate or en banc review. See, e.g., United States
v. Hardman, No. 99-4210, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17702, at *46 n.18 (10th Cir. Aug. 8,
2001) (2–1 decision), vacated on rehearing en banc, 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2001); Jaffree
v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1118–28 (S.D. Ala. 1983), rev’d sub nom.
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1530–33 (11th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 472 U.S. 38, 48–50
(1985); E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. State, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 912 n.2 (Ct. App.
1999), vacated on petition for cert., 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000).
5. See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020,
3084 n.20 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–93 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709, 727–28 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49–51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 677–80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
6. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 253–58 (Brennan, J., concurring); 2 KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 33–39 (2008) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, RELIGION];
Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1295, 1316–19 (2009) [hereinafter Aynes, Ink Blot or Not]; Richard L. Aynes,
McDonald v. Chicago, Self-Defense, the Right to Bear Arms, and the Future, 2 AKRON J.
CONST. L. & POL’Y. 181, 188–90 (2011) [hereinafter Aynes, McDonald]; Kent Greenawalt,
Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Understandings of the Religion Clauses, 8
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 508–10 (2006) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Common Sense]; Kurt T.
Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment
Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995) [hereinafter Lash, Establishment Clause]; Douglas
Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 411–16
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Early opponents of Establishment Clause incorporation maintained that the
Clause was originally understood merely to have reserved to the states the power to
establish or disestablish religion.7 If the purpose of the Clause was to protect state
prerogatives, the arguments went, then it was (i) logically incoherent to apply it
against the states,8 and (ii) textually unjustified to use due-process “liberty” as the
vehicle for doing so.9 A running joke likens it to applying the Tenth Amendment to
limit state power.10
Early anti-incorporationists did not discuss the drafting or ratification history of
the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the original understanding of that
amendment would seem to be the decisive issue.11 The only Reconstruction-era
history they brought to bear concerned the failed federal Blaine Amendment,12
which (among many other things) would have applied the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses to the states. Why would Congress consider Blaine in 1876, the
argument went, if the Fourteenth Amendment had already applied the
Establishment Clause to the states in 1868?13 Ergo, the Amendment must not have
applied the Clause to the states in 1868.
Early anti-incorporationists set the rhetorical template followed by virtually
every anti-incorporation argument that has followed. Conclusions about the logical
and textual incoherence of Establishment Clause incorporation frame a historical
record consisting of Blaine and little else.14 After all, if Establishment Clause
incorporation is not logically and textually defensible, why bother with any more
history than Blaine?
(1986) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious Liberty]; Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships,
the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding Extremes but Missing the Liberty,
118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 241–43 (2004) [hereinafter Laycock, Theology Scholarships].
7. See Corwin, supra note 3, at 11–12, 15; Snee, supra note 3, at 373–89, 392, 406. In
its most precise sense, “incorporation” refers to judicial application against the states of the
original eighteenth-century understandings of the various provisions of the Bill of Rights as
dimensions of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For stylistic simplicity, however, I often use “incorporation” less precisely, to
refer simply to the application of the Establishment Clause and other provisions of the Bill of
Rights against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment generally.
Additionally, I often use “anti-incorporationist” and “incorporationist” to refer to
one’s position on the Fourteenth Amendment’s application of the Establishment Clause to
the states, as well as on its application of all or most of the Bill of Rights to the states.
8. See infra Part I.B.1.a.
9. See infra Part I.B.1.b.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”); see, e.g., AMAR, supra note 4, at 34; BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 95; Conkle,
supra note 4, at 1141; Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6, at 1099; Lietzau, supra
note 4, at 1206; Paulsen, supra note 4, at 317; Porth & George, supra note 4, at 139; Snee,
supra note 3, at 388; Note, Rethinking Incorporation, supra note 4, at 1709.
11. The first serious examination did not come until fifteen years after the Clause was
incorporated by Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see, e.g., Kruse, supra note 4, at
110–13 (relying primarily on the work of Charles Fairman to conclude that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not understood to apply the Religion Clauses to the states).
12. 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875).
13. See infra Part I.B.1.c.
14. See infra Part I.B.2.
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But the Blaine Amendment is exceedingly weak historical evidence against
Establishment Clause incorporation, a weakness obscured by framing Blaine with
incorporation’s supposed illogic and textual infidelity.15 Shorn of this frame, Blaine
has little interpretive significance; the lenses of logical incoherence and textual
infidelity do the real persuasive work.16 Blaine is just anti-incorporation overkill, a
flashy, historical weapon aimed at an argument already logically and textually
dead. The absence of logic and text are also crucial frames for the purported silence
of the Fourteenth Amendment framers about Establishment Clause incorporation,17
and even enable an anti-incorporation “originalism” that manages no reference to
evidence of original meaning.18
Reasoned defenses of Establishment Clause incorporation are few. The Supreme
Court defends incorporation with bare appeals to precedent,19 while general
incorporation theorists avoid the problem altogether.20 Most scholarly defenses
actually concede the anti-incorporationist critique, arguing that the Clause evolved
into a nineteenth-century personal right from structural and nonsubstantive
eighteenth-century origins.21 Application of the Establishment Clause to the states
thus seems simultaneously indefensible and indispensable, like a coup d’état
against an elected but corrupt government.
The lack of a logical, textual, and historically plausible account of Establishment
Clause incorporation constitutes a critical doctrinal void. Challenges to state action
have generated almost the entire corpus of contemporary Establishment Clause

15. See infra Part I.C.
16. See infra Part I.C.1.
17. See infra Part I.C.2.
18. See infra Part I.C.3.
19. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48–49 (1985) (explaining that
Establishment Clause incorporation is a legal doctrine “firmly embedded in our
constitutional jurisprudence”); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215, 217 (1963)
(explaining that Establishment Clause incorporation is a “decisively settled” question, and
disincorporation is “entirely untenable”); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 149–50, 226–27 (2nd rev. ed. 1994) (arguing
that although Fairman’s work and Blaine decisively prove that incorporation was not
intended by the Fourteenth Amendment framers, the openness of the Amendment’s text to
incorporation and the Court’s unanimous and bipartisan First Amendment incorporation
precedents affirm its legitimacy).
20. For example, Michael Kent Curtis’s path-breaking NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE
(1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS], does not discuss Establishment Clause
incorporation. See also Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the
Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509,
1515 n.12 (2007) [hereinafter Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights] (noting but not
addressing the question of Establishment Clause incorporation).
21. See infra Part I.D. A few scholars, notably Douglas Laycock, argue that the Clause
was originally understood to constitute a substantive personal right—“freedom from
establishment”—as well as a structural reservation of state power. See, e.g., Laycock,
Theology Scholarships, supra note 6, at 241–43 (citing and discussing Douglas Laycock,
“Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 875, 885–910 (1986)); Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 6, at 411–16. While I
am sympathetic to this reading of the Clause’s original meaning, in this Article I take as a
premise the predominant scholarly view that the Clause was purely structural and federalist
in origin. See infra text accompanying notes 36–37.
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doctrine. If the Establishment Clause were disincorporated, states would be
constitutionally empowered to:
(i)

delegate government power to religious organizations;22

(ii)

make theological judgments when parties consent to the state’s
jurisdiction;23

(iii) levy taxes dedicated to the support of a particular religion or religion
generally;24
(iv) grant financial or in-kind assistance to prayer, worship, and other
unambiguously religious activities;25
(v)

endorse or condemn particular religions;26

(vi) underwrite prayer, religious education, and other religious services in
public schools so long as participation is voluntary;27 and

22. See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (invalidating school district whose
boundaries were consciously drawn to coincide with ultra-Orthodox Jewish community);
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating municipal ordinance
granting churches and schools the power to veto bars proposed within 500 feet).
23. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
706 (2012) (“According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to
the faithful . . . violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement
in such ecclesiastical decisions.”); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696 (1976) (invalidating state court judgment that diocese did not follow its doctrine in
dismissing bishop); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (holding state
court lacked power at common law to decide theological questions in adjudicating church
property dispute); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (holding same
regarding state legislature).
24. See Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidating sales tax
exemption available only to religious periodicals); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16
(1947) (explaining that the Establishment Clause prohibits the levy of any “tax in any
amount, large or small, . . . to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion”); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878) (explaining that before ratification of the
Establishment Clause, “[t]he people were taxed, against their will, for the support of religion,
and sometimes for the support of particular sects to whose tenets they could not and did not
subscribe”).
25. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 857–60 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment) (holding that aid to religious organizations dispersed on religiously neutral
criteria violates Establishment Clause if actually diverted to unambiguously religious uses).
26. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (invalidating county courthouse
display of Ten Commandments whose purpose was to endorse a certain theological
understanding of the United States and its origins); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573 (1989) (invalidating stand-alone crèche depicting birth of Jesus displayed in city-county
building).
27. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating voluntary recitation of state-
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(vii) appropriate religious symbols and practices for its own purposes even
when they signify theological meaning or endorse a particular religion.28
Some Establishment Clause doctrines that currently prevent these possibilities
might be preserved by expanding the scope of the Free Exercise and Equal
Protection Clauses,29 though it seems unlikely that a Supreme Court willing to
disincorporate the Establishment Clause would simply graft its state limitations
onto other constitutional texts.30 Yet even a few of the foregoing doctrinal
alterations would rework the landscape of American church/state relations in ways
that were unthinkable only a decade ago.
The existence of Establishment Clause doctrine thus rests on the legitimacy of
applying the Clause to the states—a legitimacy now under sustained attack.31
Justice Thomas’s endorsement of disincorporation is especially important: it gives
calls for disincorporation the salience and respectability they would otherwise
lack,32 while also encouraging doctrinal revision that would drastically limit the
Clause’s reach even if it remains applicable to state action.33
composed prayer in public schools); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948) (invalidating voluntary religious instruction conducted by clerics on public school
grounds during school day).
28. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion) (upholding display
of Ten Commandments on state capitol grounds because its history and context were
secular); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 18 (2004) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (upholding recitation of “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance because it has merely historical significance); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961) (upholding Sunday Closing laws because their original religious purposes had
been eclipsed by contemporary secular purposes and meanings).
Professors Lupu and Tuttle have suggested one scenario in which the absence of an
incorporated Establishment Clause would allow states to retain “truth-declaring jurisdiction”
including the power “to recognize one faith as the political community’s preferred religion”
and offering,
a preferred faith a significant set of privileges, including public funding of
ministries and houses of worship, the right to place religious displays in public
buildings, the right to appoint chaplains for public institutions, observation of
the tradition’s religious holidays, and exclusive reference to that tradition’s
religious beliefs in public proclamations[,] limited only by a tolerance norm
prohibiting coercion or “undue pressure.”
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19, 99 (2006)
[hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Federalism & Faith].
29. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
534 (1993) (invalidating state action that singled out a minority religion for special burdens);
see also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
increased judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause for government actions that
burden particular religions).
30. Cf. Lupu & Tuttle, Federalism & Faith, supra note 28, at 103–04 (“It would make
no sense to liberate the states from the periphery of the Establishment Clause and then set up
doctrines that would require them to justify every move into that periphery.”).
31. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Doshi, supra note 4, at 480–502 (using Justice Thomas’s antiincorporation opinions to call for disincorporation); Hilton, supra note 4 (same); Knicely,
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As Professor Curtis has observed, the persisting idea that Bill of Rights
incorporation is constitutionally unjustifiable “eats like acid at the legitimacy of
federal protection of civil liberty.”34 The supposed absence of logical and textual
justifications of Establishment Clause incorporation likewise places Establishment
Clause doctrine under perpetual clouds of instability, illegitimacy, and
controversy.35
Establishment Clause incorporation is both logically coherent and textually
defensible.36 Its logic and textuality can be defended, moreover, on the basis of the
most widely accepted original understanding of the Clause as a purely structural
limitation that prevented Congress from establishing a national church or
interfering in state establishment or disestablishment decisions,37 and without
recourse to an original or evolved understanding that the Clause specified a
personal right.38 A crucial anti-incorporation premise—also conceded by many
incorporationists—is the mistaken notion that “structural” constitutional provisions
do not protect a personal liberty interest susceptible of incorporation.39 To the
contrary, constitutional structures that disable the government from acting are
necessarily accompanied by correlative personal immunities from such actions,
which sound in the personal liberty and citizen immunities protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment against state deprivation.40
The Establishment Clause is one such constitutional disability. The Clause is not
a mere “reservation” of state power over religious establishment or
disestablishment, as anti-incorporationists characterize it,41 but a disability that
expressly precluded Congress from using its legislative power to establish a
national religion.42 While the Clause indeed immunized the states from federal
supra note 4 (same); see also Jeffrey Toobin, Partners, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2011, at
40 (arguing that Justice Thomas is a doctrinally influential Justice who has pushed the
Roberts Court to the right); cf. Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the
Establishment Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 582, 632 (2011) (arguing the same to support
suggestion that judicial enforcement of the Establishment Clause be abandoned).
33. See, e.g., Newdow, 542 U.S. at 51 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing
that the Establishment Clause should only prohibit state action that coerces religious belief
or action); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (Thomas, J., concurring) (same);
see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Undoing Neutrality? From Church-State Separation to
Judeo-Christian Tolerance, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 691, 700–06 (2010) (demonstrating
how current doctrinal trends could combine to displace equality with tolerance as the
dominant Establishment Clause value).
34. CURTIS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 3.
35. See, e.g., Knicely, supra note 4, at 177 (“[Q]uestions linger about the history, logic,
and efficacy of Everson. If the history used by the Everson Court was wrong, ought not the
Court correct it? And if the history is corrected, is not the Court obligated as a matter of law
to revisit the legal doctrine that rests on its mistaken philosophical and historical
premises?”).
36. See infra Part II.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 176, 181.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 125–26, 128–30.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 193–97.
40. See infra Part II.A.
41. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
42. See infra Part II.B.1.a.
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interference with their exercises of reserved power over religious establishment and
disestablishment,43 it also affirmatively immunized the people from the effects of
any federal establishment of religion.44 It is simply not accurate, as antiincorporationists would have it, that the Clause lacked a dimension of substantive
personal liberty susceptible of incorporation against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. While the Establishment Clause disability indeed reserved
to the states the exclusive power to establish or disestablish religion, it also
substantively protected the people from threats to their liberty from a nationally
established religion.
Application of the Establishment Clause against the states upon ratification
through the Fourteenth Amendment eliminated the state immunity but extended the
personal immunity to prohibit state as well as federally established religion, an
elimination and extension that resonated with Reconstruction’s reordering of
federal-state relations.45 This account also squares with the two possible textual
vehicles for applying the Clause to the states, the Due Process and Privileges and
Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,46 and provides the logical and
textual framework for an understanding of the Blaine episode that is likewise
consistent with incorporation.47 Indeed, proper framing of the historical record with
logical and textual accounts of Establishment Clause incorporation yields a
plausible originalist account of that incorporation.48
Anti-incorporationists need to set aside their incredulity and ridicule of
Establishment Clause incorporation and seriously engage the merits of the logical,
textual, and historical foundations that support it. 49
I. DIMENSIONS OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE INCORPORATION
A. Casual Incorporation
The Supreme Court gave little thought to how or why the First Amendment
might limit state action before actually deciding that it did. In 1925, the Court
“assumed” without explanation that the rights guaranteed by the Speech and Press
Clauses bind the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,50 just three years after

43. See infra Part II.B.1.b.
44. See infra Part II.B.1.c. & .2.
45. See infra Part II.C.1.
46. See infra Part II.C.2.
47. See infra Part II.C.3.
48. See infra Part III.
49. See infra Conclusion.
50. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The applicability of the
freedom of speech to the states had been assumed long before formal incorporation of the
Speech Clause. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After
Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071,
1144 (2000) [hereinafter Curtis, Historical Linguistics] (noting Judge Cooley’s nineteenthcentury belief that freedom of speech applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause).
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it had rejected the identical proposition.51 Fifteen years later it held the same for the
Free Exercise Clause in Cantwell v. Connecticut,52 apparently because of its
congruence with the Speech Clause.53 Though Establishment Clause incorporation
was not before the Court in Cantwell, the Justices acted as if the Clause had already
been incorporated when the question was squarely presented in Everson v. Board of
Education.54 The basis for incorporation remained just as opaque when the Court
used the Clause to invalidate a state religious education program the next term.55
B. Anti-Incorporation Attacks
1. The Classical Template
Given the Court’s thoughtlessness on Establishment Clause incorporation, it was
hardly surprising that two prominent academics, Edward Corwin and Joseph Snee,
immediately attacked it for lack of logical, textual, and historical support.56
a. No Logic
Although Corwin alluded to the logical incoherence of Establishment Clause
incorporation,57 Snee developed the argument more fully. Exhaustively surveying

51. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
52. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
53. See id. at 307 (“The fundamental law declares the interest of the United States that
the free exercise of religion be not prohibited and that freedom to communicate information
and opinion be not abridged.”); see also Lupu & Tuttle, Federalism & Faith, supra note 28,
at 36 (“Because the Free Exercise Clause sounds in liberty in ways that strongly resemble
the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment, the textual logic of incorporating the
Free Exercise Clause seems strong.”).
54. 330 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1947).
The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its history and
the evils it was designed forever to suppress, have been several times
elaborated by the decisions of this Court prior to the application of the First
Amendment to the states by the Fourteenth. The broad meaning given the
Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted by this Court in its
decisions concerning an individual’s religious freedom rendered since the
Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First
applicable to state action abridging religious freedom. There is every reason to
give the same application and broad interpretation to the “establishment of
religion” clause.
Id. (footnotes omitted); accord id. at 26–27 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 29 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). Everson looked even stranger when barely four months later, the Court issued a
set of bitterly divided opinions in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), rejecting
“total incorporation” of the Bill of Rights. See Lupu & Tuttle, Federalism & Faith, supra
note 28, at 40–41.
55. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1948) (rejecting
without explanation counsel’s request that the Court reconsider Everson’s incorporation of
the Establishment Clause).
56. See Corwin, supra note 3; Snee, supra note 3.
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the 1787 and 1791 ratification debates, Snee concluded that “the establishment
clause was meant to reserve powers to the several states, while the free exercise
clause was meant to guarantee religious liberty of the individual citizen against
federal encroachment.”58 Unlike Corwin—and most others since—Snee located the
Constitution’s prohibition of a nationally established church in the Free Exercise
Clause,59 insisting that the Establishment Clause only prevents congressional
establishment of such a church, if at all, as supplementary protection for the
religious liberty norm embedded in the Free Exercise Clause.60 This enabled Snee
to treat the Establishment Clause as an exclusively federalist protection of state
prerogatives.61 If the Establishment Clause is a reservation of state power, Snee
argued, it cannot logically be applied to limit state power.62
b. No Text
Although neither Corwin nor Snee seemed generally opposed to the application
of fundamental personal rights against the states through the Due Process Clause,63
both were incredulous that a structural reservation of state power might be
57. See Corwin, supra note 3, at 10 (“[W]hat the ‘establishment of religion’ clause of
the First Amendment does, and all that it does, is to forbid Congress to give any religious
faith, sect, or denomination a preferred status; and the Fourteenth Amendment, in making the
clause applicable to the states, does not add to it, but logically curtails it.” (emphasis
omitted)).
58. Snee, supra note 3, at 379.
59. Compare id. at 389, 406, with Corwin, supra note 3, at 11–12 (reading the
Establishment Clause to mean that “Congress should not prescribe a national faith”), and id.
at 9–10 (agreeing with Everson’s declaration that the federal government cannot “set up a
church”). Snee’s position is similar to that argued by Akhil Amar and Justice Thomas. See
infra note 130.
60. See Snee, supra note 3, at 373 (The Establishment Clause was intended “as a
reservation of power to the respective states; and . . . possibly as a politically wise means of
forestalling any abridgement of the religious freedom of the free exercise clause on the part
of the then suspect federal power.”); see also id. at 372 (“I take no issue with those who
consider certain types of establishment to be naturally and immediately an infringement of
that religious liberty and hence forbidden to both federal and state governments by the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment as read into the Fourteenth.”); id. at 372 n.14
(“[C]ertain types of establishment would be forbidden under the Fourteenth Amendment, not
because they are establishments, but because they are such as to infringe the religious liberty
protected by that Amendment.”).
61. Compare id. at 379 (“[T]he establishment clause was meant to reserve powers to the
several states, while the free exercise clause was meant to guarantee religious liberty of the
individual citizen against federal encroachment.”), id. at 389 (“[T]he establishment clause
drew a line of demarcation, not between federal power and personal freedom, but between
federal and state sovereignty.”), and id. at 406 (“The free exercise clause precluded federal
interference with individual religious freedom. The establishment clause prevented any
federal interference, whether affirmative or negative, with existing state establishments: it
reserved all power in this regard to the several states.”), with Corwin, supra note 3, at 14
(“[T]he principal importance of the [first] amendment lay in the separation which it effected
between the respective jurisdictions of state and nation regarding religion . . . .”).
62. Snee, supra note 3, at 389, 406.
63. See Corwin, supra note 3, at 19; Snee, supra note 3, at 372, 406.
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characterized as such a right.64 As Corwin elaborated, the prohibition on religious
establishments cannot be incorporated unless it “carries with it invasion of
somebody’s freedom of religion, that is, of ‘liberty.’”65 As a purely structural
provision confirming a reservation of state power, the Establishment Clause simply
does not qualify.66
c. No History
Although Corwin and Snee rejected any historical basis for Establishment
Clause incorporation, they barely mentioned Fourteenth Amendment history. Snee
contented himself with a citation to Professor Fairman,67 while Corwin rested on a
one-paragraph summation of the failed federal Blaine Amendment.68 Proposed in
1875 and narrowly defeated, this amendment would have provided:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by
taxation in any State for the support of public schools, or derived from
any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall
ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so
raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or
denominations.69

64. Corwin, supra note 3, at 19 (“It is only liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects.”) (emphasis in original); Snee, supra note 3, at 373 (The Establishment Clause does
not “confer upon the citizen a constitutional right, and what is not a constitutional right under
the First Amendment can hardly be a fundamental concept of liberty protected by the
Fourteenth!”).
65. Corwin, supra note 3, at 20.
66. See id. at 19 (“So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, states are entirely
free to establish religions, provided they do not deprive anybody of religious liberty.”)
(emphasis omitted); see also Snee, supra note 3, at 406 (“As a reservation of power, the
establishment clause is not per se a constitutional guarantee of liberty.” (emphasis in
original)).
67. Snee, supra note 3, at 372 n.10 (citing Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?—The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949)); see also O’NEILL, supra note 3, at 155 (Application of the Establishment Clause to
the states “was unpremeditated, unforeseen, unintended by the men responsible for the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . So far as the relation of government to an establishment of
religion is concerned, any influence that is now or ever will be exercised by the Fourteenth
Amendment, is a clear constitutional accident.”).
Professor Fairman was recruited by Justice Frankfurter to write a scholarly
refutation of Justice Black’s bold thesis that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
was originally understood to have incorporated the first eight amendments to the
Constitution against the states. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–92 & app. 92–
123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The episode is recounted in NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS:
THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 307–16 (2010).
68. Corwin, supra note 3, at 17.
69. 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875).
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Noting Blaine’s quotation of the Establishment Clause, Corwin reasoned that
this language must have been thought necessary “to fill a gap in the Constitution”;
otherwise, the amendment would have been a superfluous attempt to achieve an
already-accomplished constitutional goal.70 Assuming that Congress would not
have exerted itself to do something it had already done, Corwin concluded that the
Establishment Clause must not have been understood to apply to the states when
Blaine was introduced.
* * *
Professors Corwin and Snee set the template for criticizing Establishment
Clause incorporation: (1) as a federalist confirmation of reserved state power over
religious establishment and disestablishment, the Establishment Clause logically
cannot limit state power; (2) as a mere structural restraint the Clause does not
protect a personal privilege, immunity, right, or liberty that the Fourteenth
Amendment could have applied against the states; and (3) the post-ratification
proposal of the Blaine Amendment decisively confirmed (1) and (2), showing that
less than a decade after ratification, Congress did not understand the Fourteenth
Amendment to have applied the Establishment Clause against the states.
2. Contemporary Revival
The question of Establishment Clause incorporation lay largely dormant until
the 1980s, when it was reawakened by controversies over federalism,71 church-state
relations,72 and constitutional interpretation.73 Later scholarship, however, has
hardly advanced from the template set down decades earlier by Corwin and Snee.
Like them, most contemporary scholars reject incorporation on some combination
of logic, text, and Blaine, while otherwise ignoring Reconstruction history.74 A few

70. Corwin, supra note 3, at 17.
71. E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)) (holding that state immunity from
federal regulation confirmed by Tenth Amendment is not judicially enforceable); see Noah
Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 406
(2002) (describing the rise of “neofederalism” during the Reagan administration and its
consistency with an original understanding of the Establishment Clause as structural and
federalist).
72. E.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (invalidating government monitoring to
ensure that government aid is not diverted to religious uses), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997); Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (invalidating government aid
that might conceivably be diverted to religious uses); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)
(invalidating state statute providing for “moment of silence” at beginning of public school
day on basis of legislative motivation to encourage silent, voluntary, individual prayer by
students, and rejecting lower court determination that the Establishment Clause did not bind
the states).
73. E.g., Edwin Meese III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a
Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455 (1986) (advocating an “intentionalist”
interpretive jurisprudence which precluded Establishment Clause incorporation).
74. See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 4, at 95 (rejecting Establishment Clause
incorporation on ground of incoherence); DREISBACH, supra note 4, at 92–95 (same on
grounds of incoherence, Blaine, and general anti-incorporationist arguments of Fairman and
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contemporary anti-incorporationist scholars take Fourteenth Amendment history a
bit more seriously, but only to add that anti-establishment concerns were
supposedly absent from congressional debates and other public discussions of the
Amendment.75
Justice Thomas follows the classical template. Though he does not mention
Blaine, he argues that the original understanding of the Establishment Clause
merely prohibited establishment of a “national religion” and clarified that
“Congress could not interfere with state establishments.”76 He thus concludes that
incorporation is both illogical and textually problematic.77 He consistently calls for
either outright disincorporation of the Clause or substantial reduction in the scope
and rigor with which it is applied to the states.78 Despite a similarly strong
Berger); SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 4, at 21–26, 49–54 (same on grounds of
incoherence and Blaine, and implicitly on the ground of textual inconsistency); Conkle,
supra note 4, at 1135–42 (same on grounds of incoherence, textual inconsistency, and
Blaine); Duncan, supra note 4, at 40–43 (same on implicit grounds of incoherence and
textual inconsistency); Knicely, supra note 4, at 200–203, 206–10 (same on grounds of
incoherence, textual inconsistency, and Blaine); Lietzau, supra note 4, at 1206–10 (same);
McClellan, supra note 4, at 314–19 (same); Meier, supra note 4, at 164 (same on ground of
incoherence); Paulsen, supra note 4, at 317–18 & n.38, 322–25 (same); Porth & George,
supra note 4, at 138–39 (same); Rosenkranz, supra note 4, at 1060 (same on grounds of
incoherence and textual inconsistency); Note, Rethinking Incorporation, supra note 4, at
1708–14 (same on grounds of incoherence, textual inconsistency, and Blaine); see also
Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1118–28 (S.D. Ala. 1983) (rejecting
Establishment Clause incorporation on grounds of Blaine and general anti-incorporation
arguments of Fairman and Berger), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace,
705 F.2d 1526, 1530–33 (11th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 472 U.S. 38, 48–50 (1985).
75. See, e.g., Brose, supra note 4, at 17–29 (rejecting incorporation on grounds of
textual inconsistency and congressional silence about anti-establishment norms); Muñoz,
supra note 4, at 631–35 (same on grounds of incoherence, textual inconsistency, Blaine, and
congressional silence); Doshi, supra note 4, at 468–70 (same on grounds of incoherence,
textual inconsistency, Blaine, and congressional silence); Hilton, supra note 4, at 1715–23
(same on grounds of textual inconsistency and congressional silence).
76. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
77. Id. at 45–46 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Establishment Clause
is [best understood as] a federalism provision, which, for this reason, resists incorporation.”);
id. at 50 (“[T]he Establishment Clause . . . protects state establishments from federal
interference but does not protect any individual right. These two features independently
make incorporation of the Clause difficult to understand.”); id. at 51 (“[E]ven assuming that
the Establishment Clause precludes the Federal Government from establishing a national
religion, it does not follow that the Clause created or protects any individual right. . . . [I]t is
more likely that States and only States were the direct beneficiaries. Moreover, incorporation
of this putative individual right leads to a peculiar outcome: It would prohibit precisely what
the Establishment Clause was intended to protect—state establishments of religion. . . . I
would welcome the opportunity to consider more fully the difficult questions whether and
how the Establishment Clause applies against the States. One observation suffices for now:
As strange as it sounds, an incorporated Establishment Clause prohibits exactly what the
Establishment Clause protected—state practices that pertain to an establishment of
religion.’” (internal citations and quotation omitted)).
78. Besides Justice Thomas’s opinion in Newdow, see Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v.
Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);

2013]

INCORPORATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

683

commitment to originalism,79 however, Thomas has never discussed
Reconstruction-era history in connection with the Establishment Clause, not even
with reference to Blaine. Like other anti-incorporationists, he is content to let logic
and text do the heavy lifting.
C. Framing Effect
Logic and text have long been powerful tools of legal and constitutional
reasoning.80 Postmodern critiques have exposed the contingency and indeterminacy
of such arguments,81 but have done little to dislodge their authority in law. Once a
legal position is persuasively painted as illogical or irreconcilable with the
authoritative texts, even powerful historical evidence will not save it.82
Of course, “powerful” historical evidence—evidence that is unambiguous and
uncontradicted—is rarely available. By now, historians take as givens that the
meanings of historical records are irreducibly plural and that writing history
requires interpretation as well as report.83 No one encounters history “fresh,”
McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3084 n.20 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–94 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726–28 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678–80 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
79. E.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058–84 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms was understood in 1868 as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship applied to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584–93
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Commerce Clause was not originally
understood to have granted Congress the power to regulate activities that might reasonably
be thought to “substantially affect” interstate commerce).
80. See, e.g., MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 167, 170 (1933) (“[T]he
effort to assume the form of a deductive system underlies all constructive legal
scholarship. . . . [T]he rôle of deduction is not an accidental incident in law and natural
science but is rather an essential part of their life.”); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 407, at 391 n.1 (1833) (“It is obvious, that there can
be no security to the people in any constitution of government, if they are not to judge of it
by the fair meaning of the words of the text . . . .”); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1105, 1107 (1989) (“The traditional view of law is largely dependent upon objectivist
assumptions about reasoning and categorization.”).
81. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, Signature Event Context, in LIMITED INC (1972)
(Samuel Weber & Jeffrey Mehlman trans., 1977); Paul Ricoeur, What Is a Text?, in
TWENTIETH-CENTURY LITERARY THEORY 331 (Vassilis Lambropoulos & David Neal Miller
eds., 1987).
82. See COHEN, supra note 80, at 195 (“[L]aw that is not logical, is like pre-scientific
medicine—a hodge-podge of sense and superstition . . . .”); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1–12, at 32, 38 (3d ed. 2000) (“To treat text as
paramount . . . seems all but inevitable if the Constitution is to be seriously regarded as
law . . . . [A]nything flatly contrary to it cannot stand . . . .”).
83. See, e.g., HAYDEN WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM
101–34 (1978) (arguing that historical facts are constituted by interpretation, and history
itself by the narratives in which such facts are embedded); GORDON S. WOOD, THE PURPOSE
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without pre-existing commitments and expectations.84 This plurality and
subjectivity are challenging for lawyers, who draw their arguments from a unified
narrative that has assessed, labeled, and weighed the evidence to yield a single
“objective” conclusion.85 This underscores the improbability that one can read a
historical record to contradict pre-existing judgments of incoherence or textual
infidelity (let alone both).86
The rhetorical hegemony of logic and text is well illustrated by arguments
against Establishment Clause incorporation. The overwhelming consensus that
incorporation is logically incoherent and textually impossible guarantees that
readings of the historical record will likewise conclude that history weighs against
incorporation. But as this section demonstrates, the historical evidence actually
invoked by anti-incorporationists is scant, consisting entirely of congressional
efforts to approve the Blaine Amendment, and the purported silence of Fourteenth
Amendment framers and ratifiers about anti-establishment concerns. The former is

PAST passim (2008) (discussing the plurality and constructed nature of historical
meaning); Steven K. Green, “Bad History”: The Lure of History in Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1717, 1730 (2006) [hereinafter Green, “Bad
History”] (“Despite their commitment to objectivity, historians also understand . . . that
history is not objective. Any exploration into history is selective, and all (good) accounts of
history are interpretive.”).
84. See WOOD, supra note 83, at 8–9, 39, 223 (observing how historians sometimes
project contemporary issues and concerns onto the past); cf. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH
AND METHOD 294 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 2004) (“[W]e
understand traditionary texts on the basis of expectations of meaning drawn from our own
prior relation to the subject matter.”); PAUL RICOEUR, HISTORY AND TRUTH 29 (Charles A.
Kelbley trans., 1992) (“The historian goes to the men of the past with his own human
experience. The historian’s subjectivity takes on a striking prominence at the moment when,
over and above all critical chronology, history makes the values of past men surge forth.”).
85. See, e.g., JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 802 (1973) (“From the
beginning you know where the lawyer wants to come out, and every word points that way.”);
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 40–44 (1983) (describing the “jurispathic” character of legal narrative,
which abides only one account of controlling law and liquidates all interpretive competitors);
Green, “Bad History”, supra note 83, at 1729–30.
Historians . . . do not mine the pages of historical information to uncover
“truths”; the study of history is not to provide “answers” to modern questions
but to provide understanding of our past in the hope it may illuminate the
present. In contrast, constitutional lawyers primarily approach history as
advocates seeking authority for the propositions they hope to prove.
Id. (footnote omitted).
86. Cf. Peter H. Ditto, David A. Pizarro & David Tannenbaum, Motivated Moral
Reasoning, in 50 PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 307, 310 (2009) (“[P]eople
(like attorneys) often have a preference for reaching one conclusion over another, and these
directional motivations serve to tip judgment processes in favor of whatever conclusion is
preferred.” (citation omitted)); Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword:
Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems from Constitutional Law, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (2011) (discussing the “unconscious tendency of individuals to process
information in a manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to the formation of accurate
beliefs”).
OF THE
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hardly persuasive, and the second is simply wrong.87 What makes this reading of
history seem persuasive—indeed, dispositive—is its framing by incorporation’s
supposed illogic and textual infidelity.
1. Framing Blaine
Daniel Conkle uses the logical and textual arguments from the classical template
to inflate the weak significance of Blaine, just as Professor Snee did.88 Conkle
contends that his anti-incorporationist conclusion is “firmly supported” by
historical evidence—consisting only of Blaine—but he bolsters this with “language
and logic,” which “independently compel a rejection of the incorporation
argument.”89 Conkle concludes that the case for Establishment Clause
incorporation is made “exceedingly difficult” by text and logic, imposing a “heavy
burden of persuasion” on any historical argument supporting such incorporation.90
The problems with using Blaine as anti-incorporation evidence are legion, but
can be summarized as follows:
(i) It is odd to count the supposed redundancy of Blaine as antiincorporation evidence when the Bill of Rights itself was thought
redundant of the 1787 constitutional text, and the Fourteenth
Amendment redundant of both the 1787 text and common law
privileges and immunities.91 Indeed, people on both sides of the Blaine
debate thought the proposal superfluous.92
(ii) Blaine may have quoted the Religion Clauses merely to provide
political cover for its more controversial nativist restrictions.93

87. See infra Part III.
88. See supra Part I.B.1.c.
89. Conkle, supra note 4, at 1139, 1140 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 1142.
91. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 4, at 254 n.*; LEVY, supra note 19, at 83, 91; RODNEY
K. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION 165 (1987) [hereinafter R. SMITH]; THE
FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 578, 579 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961) (“Here, in
strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain every thing, they have no need of
particular reservations. . . . [W]hy declare that things shall not be done which there is no
power to do?”).
92. See Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 38,
65 (1992) [hereinafter Green, The Blaine Amendment].
93. See AMAR, supra note 4, at 254 n.*; Green, The Blaine Amendment, supra note 92,
at 51 n.84, 54 & n.107; John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 302 (2001); Lash, Establishment Clause,
supra note 6, at 1147–48.
In addition to applying the Religion Clauses against the states, Blaine would have
absolutely prohibited the use or control of tax money, public lands, and other state resources
by “any religious sect.” See supra text accompanying note 69. These provisions were widely
understood to have been directed against efforts by Roman Catholics to obtain state support
for parochial schools serving a swelling Catholic immigrant population.
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(iii) Between the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
congressional debates on Blaine, the Supreme Court decisively rejected
the general incorporation thesis without seriously investigating either
the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment or the
intentions of its drafters and ratifiers.94 The Blaine debates may not
have reflected an original incorporationist understanding because by the
time they took place the Supreme Court had decisively rejected that
understanding.95
(iv) The incorporation question was only a small part of the Blaine
debates, which were principally focused on questions about aid to
religious schools and state control of public education.96 Even so, at
least one participant in the Blaine debates believed that the Fourteenth
Amendment had already applied the Religion Clauses to the states,97
and little more than a year later, two other members of Congress
manifested the same belief.98
Were Blaine the only originalist evidence bearing on Establishment Clause
incorporation, it is hard to imagine any careful scholar characterizing it as
“substantial” evidence against Establishment Clause incorporation—and Conkle is
a careful scholar. It is the logical and textual case against incorporation that enables
Conkle and other anti-incorporationists to plausibly characterize Blaine as
meaningful evidence. It is only because logic and text seem to point against
incorporation that Blaine seems to point there, too.
2. Framing Silence
Several anti-incorporationists have argued that members of Congress did not
discuss the Establishment Clause or anti-establishment norms in ratification debates

94. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not protect the First Amendment right of assembly and Second Amendment
right to bear arms); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876) (same regarding the Seventh
Amendment right to trial against contrary state action); see also Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 96 (1908) (conceding that Slaughter-House “[u]ndoubtedly . . . gave much less
effect to the Fourteenth Amendment than some of the public men active in framing it
intended, and disappointed many others”); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1872) (conventionally read as having rejected application to the states of most provisions of
the Bill of Rights).
Although Blaine was introduced on December 14, 1875, it was not debated and
voted upon by Congress until August 4, 1876, see 4 CONG. REC. 5189–91 (1876), months
after Walker and Cruikshank had been argued and decided in March and April 1876, ANNE
ASHMORE, DATES OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND ARGUMENTS (2006), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/datesofdecisions.pdf.
95. CURTIS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 170; Green, The Blaine Amendment,
supra note 92, at 50–51; Lupu & Tuttle, Federalism & Faith, supra note 28, at 47–48.
96. Green, The Blaine Amendment, supra note 92, at 61.
97. 4 CONG. REC. 5585 (1876) (remarks of Sen. Oliver Morton (R-IN)).
98. See 2 CONG. REC. app. 242 (1874) (Sen. Thomas Norwood (D-GA)); id. at 384–85
(Rep. Roger Mills (D-TX)).
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and public discussions relating to the Fourteenth Amendment and related
legislation, although they did refer to free exercise norms.99 Jonathan Brose
provides the most detailed version of this argument.100 Brose catalogues the various
ways in which members of Congress referred to religion during these debates:
liberty of “conscience,”101 “freedom of religious opinion,”102 freedom of “religious
worship,”103 “free exercise of religion,”104 “freedom in religion,”105 “reserved
rights” for the regulation of “churches,”106 and last, but not least, “establishment of
religion.”107 Brose repeatedly argues that no one understood the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect anything except “personal rights,”108 and that “the right to
be free from the establishment of religion” is almost entirely absent from the
debates, while free exercise rights are often mentioned.109
The logical and textual frames are obvious in Brose’s reliance on the notion of
“personal rights” to exclude Establishment Clause incorporation. Since the Clause
only protected state power, Brose argues, the Fourteenth Amendment framers must
not have understood it to be included in any references to “personal rights.”110 This
pushes him to characterize virtually every reference to religion and religious
freedom as a reflection of personal free exercise rights rather than structural antiestablishment norms. Many of these characterizations are questionable. “Liberty of

99. See, e.g., Brose, supra note 4, at 18–29; Muñoz, supra note 4, at 633–34; Doshi,
supra note 4, at 469. But see Kruse, supra note 4, at 110–14 (arguing that references to both
Religion Clauses were absent from the debates).
100. See Brose, supra note 4, at 18–29.
101. Id. at 19, 20 (Rep. John Bingham (R-OH), arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment
would protect “freedom of conscience” and “rights of conscience” from state action); id. at
21 (Sen. Trumbull (D-IL), arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment would protect “the right
of exercising personal conscience” against state action).
102. Id. at 21–22 (Sen. Wilson (R-MA), in an 1864 debate about abolishing slavery).
103. Id. at 23 (Rep. Hart (R-NY), citing Nevada Admission Act requiring constitutional
guarantee that “no inhabitant shall ever be molested on account of his or her mode of
religious worship”) (ellipses omitted).
104. Id. at 23 (Rep. Hart (R-NY), explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that “no law shall be made prohibiting the free exercise of religion”); id. at 25 (Rep. Dawes
(R-MA), listing “the free exercise of his religious belief” among the privileges and
immunities of the citizen protected by the Ku Klux Klan Act); id. at 27 (Sen. Vickers (DMD), saying that the Amnesty Bill would encroach upon reserved state rights, including
“free exercise of religious worship”).
105. Id. at 24 (Rep. Maynard (R-TN), arguing that the Ku Klux Klan Act protects
“freedom of speech, of the press; . . . in religion, in house, papers, and effects”).
106. Id. at 26–27 (Sen. Vickers (D-MD), arguing that the Amnesty Bill would “encroach
upon [the States] reserved rights, of controlling and managing their schools, juries, churches,
cemeteries, and benevolent associations . . . .”) (alterations in original).
107. Id. at 28 (Sen. Thurman (D-OH), arguing that the civil rights included the
protections of the Religion Clauses “against any establishment of religion by act of
Congress” and infringement upon the “free exercise of religion”) (emphasis omitted); id. at
29 (Sen. Norwood (D-GA), saying that the Fourteenth Amendment provided that no state
may “establish a particular religion”).
108. See, e.g., id. at 18–20, 22, 24, 26–28.
109. See, e.g., id. at 18–20, 22, 23, 26, 28.
110. See id. at 6, 17.
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conscience,” for example, has been linked to the original understanding of the
Establishment Clause.111 Freedom of worship and free expression of religious
opinion are similarly two personal rights that were regularly subverted by
established religions in both the colonies and eighteenth-century England, and thus
were understood to be protected by anti-establishment norms in the nineteenth
century.112 It is not obvious that these references signify free exercise rather than
anti-establishment norms unless, like Brose, one first begs the question whether a
structural restraint can sound in personal liberty.113
The purported silence of the Fourteenth Amendment framers on Establishment
Clause incorporation would be an unreliable measure of constitutional meaning in
any circumstance,114 let alone when, as here, the framers were actually not silent
about the matter. As in Conkle’s invocation of Blaine, logic and text do the real
rhetorical work in the anti-incorporation argument from silence.
3. Framing Original Meaning
Relying on Conkle’s arguments,115 Steven Smith illustrates how far the logical
and textual arguments can push an anti-incorporationist originalism on virtually no
historical evidence. Smith expressly makes the logical point from the classical
template,116 right after implicitly making the textual one.117 He then turns to the

111. See Feldman, supra note 71, at 398–412 (arguing that a principal purpose of the
Establishment Clause was to protect the liberty of conscience from violation by federally
enforced tax assessments to support religion); Steven K. Green, Federalism and the
Establishment Clause: A Reassessment, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 761, 766–67, 786–88 (2005)
[hereinafter Green, A Reassessment] (same).
112. See GREENAWALT, RELIGION, supra note 6, at 34–35; Green, A Reassessment, supra
note 111, at 774–77, 787, 790–95; Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 6, at 242–43;
see also School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
113. Compare Feldman, supra note 71, at 403 n.321 (“[Both Religion Clauses were
originally] thought necessary to protect liberty of conscience: The Establishment Clause
protected individuals from laws that would compel them to participate in a religion specified
by the state, and the Free Exercise Clause protected them from laws that would have barred
them from affirmatively engaging in their own religious exercises.”), with GREENAWALT,
RELIGION, supra note 6, at 22, 34 (“Separation and disestablishment were the domain of the
Establishment Clause; together with the Free Exercise Clause, it guaranteed religious
equality. . . . [O]pponents of establishment regarded free exercise of religion and
nonestablishment as very closely tied. Many of the strongest arguments against what
dissenters perceived as establishments were cast in terms of liberty of conscience and equal
civil rights.” (footnote omitted)).
114. See TRIBE, supra note 82, § 2–8, at 202–05; cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979) (“[I]mplying a private right of action on the basis of congressional
silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best.”); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69
(1946) (“It is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a
controlling rule of law.”).
115. See SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 4, at 21–22, 52–53. Smith argues
that the Free Exercise Clause is also purely jurisdictional and thus lacks a substantive right
or liberty that could be incorporated. I consider his arguments only as they relate to the
Establishment Clause.
116. See id. at 24 (“[I]t seems nonsensical or incoherent to suggest that a provision
representing ‘essential federalism’ has a substantive meaning independent of its federalism
or that the provision has substantive content that can be ‘extended’ to the states. . . . [I]n its
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pro-incorporationist position, specifically Kurt Lash’s contention that by 1868 an
understanding of the Establishment Clause as a personal liberty had displaced the
original structural understanding.118 Smith concedes that this might overcome the
logical and textual arguments against incorporation,119 but counters that Lash “must
still confront the more familiar historical objection, which asserts that the enactors
of the Fourteenth Amendment simply did not intend to incorporate the Bill of
Rights, or at least the religion clauses, at all.”120 Here Smith invokes Blaine—and
only Blaine—ultimately concluding that readings of the historical record by Lash
and others do not “appreciably strengthen the case for incorporation.”121
Smith did not intend his discussion of Lash’s pro-incorporation argument as a
comprehensive examination of the issue.122 He nevertheless illustrates how framing
the historical record with logical incoherence and textual infidelity affects historical
interpretation. When the dust clears, Smith has all but rejected that Establishment
Clause incorporation was within the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment with virtually no investigation of the historical record. Though he
notes “voluminous evidence” on both sides of the general incorporation debate,123
he nonetheless rejects Religion Clause incorporation by the familiar play of Blaine
as the lone historical anti-incorporation trump.124 This dramatically demonstrates
the rhetorical force of framing weak historical evidence with anti-incorporation
arguments from logic and text.

original form it already ‘extends’ to the states in the only sense that it could apply to them.”).
117. See id. at 21 (“If we ask . . . what principle or theory of religious liberty the framers
and ratifiers of the religion clauses adopted, the most accurate answer is ‘None.’”); see also
id. at 51 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment could not have incorporated the religion clauses
because those clauses contained no substantive principle or right to incorporate.” (emphasis
in original)).
118. Id. at 50–54 (discussing Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6).
119. Id. at 50–52.
120. Id. at 52.
121. Id. at 53; see also STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON
136–37 (1998) (“Nearly all scholars agree . . . that the establishment clause was intended at
least in part to protect state-established religion from federal intervention. But 150 years
later (and as a result of an ‘incorporation’ decision that was at best dimly understood by
those who made it, if indeed they were conscious of having made such a decision at all), that
clause is found to authorize federal intervention to eliminate offensive state religious
practices.” (emphasis in original)).
Smith does acknowledge that if Lash were right, the historical focus for originalist
arguments would necessarily shift from the colonial and revolutionary eras to the midnineteenth century, though this would constitute a “major reorientation” of historically
supportable doctrine and norms. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 4, at 53–54.
122. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 4, at 52 (“This book is not the place to
rehearse that debate.”). As Smith notes, Lash’s article came to his attention as Foreordained
Failure was going to press, and Smith’s discussion appears in a chapter addendum. Smith
has not revisited Lash’s argument in subsequent work.
123. Id. (quoting WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3 (1988) (original
alteration omitted)).
124. See id. at 52–53.
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D. Fainthearted Defenses
Defenses of incorporation mostly concede the anti-incorporationist critique that
the Establishment Clause was originally understood as a purely structural and
federalist limitation that could not have been logically and textually incorporated
against the states. Their primary concern, therefore, is to establish that the public
meaning of the Clause evolved from a structural restraint in 1791 to a personal
right in 1868.
Justice Brennan’s early defense of incorporation, for example, noted that the
Establishment Clause could not have been incorporated if it were a mere
reservation of state power over religious establishments,125 but suggested that by
1868, the Clause’s meaning had shifted to encompass a personal right susceptible
to incorporation.126 As for the Blaine Amendment, Brennan dismissed it as
“prov[ing] too much,” since Blaine would also have expressly applied the Free
Exercise Clause to the states, and incorporation of that Clause is beyond dispute.127
Kurt Lash’s leading academic defense of Establishment Clause incorporation
likewise accepts that the Clause was originally understood as a mere structural and
federalist protection of state power over religion;128 Lash even repeats the logical
and textual arguments from the classical template.129 He defends incorporation by
an exhaustive review of antebellum legal history which shows, he argues, that by
the late 1860s the Establishment Clause had evolved from a structural protection of
state power to “a principle of personal freedom—the immunity from government
power of the subject of religion.”130

125. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
126. Id. at 254, 256.
127. Id. at 257. Blaine might not have “proved too much” after all; scholars have since
argued that the Due Process Clause did not incorporate the Free Exercise Clause either, see,
e.g., SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 4, at 35–43, 49–54, not to mention the
entire First Amendment, see Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment:
Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539
(1995) [hereinafter Bybee, Taking Liberties].
128. See Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6, at 1098–99 (“[S]tatements by those
involved in the framing of the Establishment Clause, early constitutional treatise writers,
numerous congressional leaders, and even the Supreme Court, are remarkably consistent in
their interpretation of the Establishment Clause as representing no power to the federal
government and reserving the same to the states.”).
129. Id. at 1099 (“Whether accomplished through the Due Process Clause, or . . . the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, incorporation assumes the existence of a personal freedom
that can sensibly be protected against state action. But how can the original Establishment
Clause—an expression of the rights (or powers) of states—be read as a personal liberty
against the states? It would make just as much (or as little) sense to incorporate the Tenth
Amendment.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
130. Id. at 1141. Ahkil Amar suggests a similar defense of Establishment Clause
incorporation, but in a way that makes incorporation ultimately beside the point. Like Lash,
he concedes that the Establishment Clause was originally understood as a “pure federalism
provision” intended to protect state establishments of religion from federal interference.
AMAR, supra note 4, at 246. Like Lash, the question for Amar is whether the meaning of the
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With respect to the ratification debates, Lash notes condemnation of Southern
regulation of black churches by members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress,131 as well
as other Reconstruction era references which referred to “privileges,”
“immunities,” “rights,” or “liberties” protected by the Establishment Clause.132 He
dismisses Blaine as a nativist effort to establish Protestantism that actually
conflicted with then-current understandings of the Religion Clauses.133
Lash’s work is the most complete and detailed defense of Establishment Clause
incorporation in the academic literature,134 and undergirds most contemporary
defenses of incorporation.135 It is noteworthy, then, that he emphatically rejects that
any portion of the original understanding of the Establishment Clause was
susceptible to incorporation.136 Like Brennan, Lash concludes that only an evolved
understanding of the Clause could have been applied against the states in 1868.137

Clause had altered during the antebellum period, from a structural restriction to a “private
right,” thus becoming susceptible to incorporation under Amar’s “refined incorporation”
theory. Id. at 252, 255. Amar tentatively suggests that the Clause may have come to reflect
an anti-establishment right as state establishments died out through the antebellum era and
that this growing anti-establishment sensibility in the larger political culture was reflected in
anti-establishment provisions in federal territorial ordinances. These, in turn, were adopted
as anti-establishment provisions in state constitutions as the territories governed by such
ordinances were admitted as states, and as longtime members of the Union abandoned their
state establishments and adopted similar anti-establishment amendments or revisions to their
state constitutions. See id. at 248–52.
Amar concludes that by the 1860s the Establishment Clause might have morphed
into a protection of religious liberty, but one that largely duplicated the protection of liberty
afforded by the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses. See id. at 252–54, 256. For
Amar then, as for Justice Thomas, whether the Establishment Clause was applied against the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment is unimportant because the same work is done
elsewhere in the Constitution. Cf. Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional
Symphony: Akhil Reed Amar’s The Bill of Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 485, 494 n.39 (1999)
[hereinafter Lash, Two Movements] (“Amar has made the Establishment Clause disappear by
defining its core (prohibiting coercive establishments) as ‘really’ involving free exercise
concerns.”).
131. Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6, at 1142.
132. Id. at 1143.
133. See id. at 1147–50.
134. In addition to Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6, see Lash, Two Movements,
supra note 130, at 492–98; Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 447, 456–59 (2009) [hereinafter Lash, Beyond Incorporation]. See also Kurt T. Lash,
The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994) [hereinafter Lash, Free Exercise]
(making analogous arguments in relation to the Free Exercise Clause).
135. See, e.g., Aynes, Ink Blot or Not, supra note 6, at 1317–18 & nn.118–19; Aynes,
McDonald, supra note 6, at 189–90 & nn.47–48, 52; Greenawalt, Common Sense, supra note
6, at 508–09 & n.122, 124; Laycock, Theology Scholarships, supra note 6, at 242 & n.549.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 128–29.
137. See Lash, Beyond Incorporation, supra note 134, at 458–59; see also LEVY, supra
note 19, at 148, 225 (asserting that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
understand it to apply the Establishment Clause to the states, but defending its incorporation
on textual grounds).
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II. A TEXTUAL LOGIC FOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE INCORPORATION
The logical and textual arguments against Establishment Clause incorporation
presuppose that the Establishment Clause was only a reservation to the states of
power over religious establishment and disestablishment, which thus also prevented
congressional establishment of a national church. As Justice Thomas states, “States
and only States were the direct beneficiaries.”138 In this view, a reservation of state
power cannot logically limit state power, nor can it be a personal “privilege,”
“immunity,” “liberty,” or right applicable to the states through the Privileges or
Immunities or Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This presupposition is wrong, and so are the conclusions drawn from it. The
argument begins with Wesley Hohfeld’s famous schema of binary relationships in
common law, in particular his conclusion that legal disabilities are logically paired
with legal immunities.139 Structural constitutional restraints are disabilities that
logically correlate with corresponding constitutional immunities.140
The Establishment Clause is a particular kind of structural allocation, a denial of
power to Congress—not a reservation of power to the states—over religious
establishments.141 As a structural restraint on the exercise of congressional power,
the Clause originally constituted a constitutional disability on Congress’s exercise
of lawmaking power that generated two immunities, only one of which was held by
the states.142 Conceptualizing the Establishment Clause as a disability that
generates multiple immunities enables an account of its later application against the
states that is logically coherent,143 textually faithful,144 and consistent with
Blaine.145
A. Constitutional Disabilities and Immunities
1. The Logic of Common-Law Relationships
Professor Hohfeld famously aligned eight common-law concepts into four
correlative relationships which, he argued, constitute the foundation of common
law: immunities and disabilities, rights and duties, powers and liabilities, and
privileges and “no-rights.”146 Hohfeld maintained that every common-law
entitlement is founded on one of these bilateral relationships; an immunity, right,
power, or privilege, in other words, necessarily entails the presence of its correlate

138. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 51 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
139. See infra Part II.A.1.
140. See infra Part II.A.2.
141. See infra Part II.B.1.
142. See infra Part II.B.2.
143. See infra Part II.C.1.
144. See infra Part II.C.2.
145. See infra Part II.C.3.
146. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–58 (1913).
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disability, duty, liability, or no-right.147 Thus, “immunity” and “disability”
constitute a logical bilateral relationship that protects the legal status and
relationships of one party from the acts of the other. If A is immune from B’s action
attempting to alter A’s legal status or relations, then B is necessarily disabled from
performing the action, and vice versa: if B is disabled from performing an action
that affects A’s status or relations, then A is necessarily immune from any legal
consequence of B’s action.148
The significance of immunity and disability is illuminated by their Hohfeldian
opposites, “liability” and “power.”149 A disability is the complete absence of legal
power—literally, a “no-power.”150 An immunity correlatively signifies the legal
irrelevance and ineffectiveness of another’s actions, the opposite of which would be
one’s liability under the law to incur the consequences of those actions.151 Hohfeld
gives the example of landowner X and a third party Y who holds no right, title, or
claim to X’s land: Y is disabled from alienating X’s title, and X is immune from the
legal effects of any efforts at alienation by Y.152
Finally, Hohfeldian relationships entail an “act-description,”153 “some situation,
or state-of-affairs,” to which one party is entitled at the expense of the other.154 In
case of a disability/immunity relationship, the act-description consists of a
prohibited act and a descriptive subject matter that together delineate the scope of
the disability/immunity. In Hohfeld’s hypothetical of X and Y immediately above,
the act-description is the alienation (act) of X’s title to her land (subject matter).
2. The Logic of Constitutional Structure
“Structural” restraints arise from the Constitution’s allocation of sovereign
power between the states and the federal government, and then among the three
federal branches.155 A structural restraint grants or withholds sovereign power to or

147. See David Kennedy, Wesley Hohfeld, in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
47, 48 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006); Walter Wheeler Cook,
Hohfeld’s Contribution to the Science of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721, 727–28 (1919); Arthur L.
Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 166 (1919); cf. AMAR, supra
note 4, at 151–52 (“The analytic truth of Hohfeld’s insight” that “rights logically implied
correlative duties . . . is hard to dispute . . . .”).
Some of Hohfeld’s contemporaries were not wholly convinced of the originality or
utility of his scheme. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 50 HARV. L.
REV. 557, 571–76 (1937) (noting Hohfeld’s indebtedness to the nineteenth-century
positivists and criticizing the artificiality of some of his legal concepts and relations).
148. See Hohfeld, supra note 146, at 55.
149. Id. at 44.
150. Id. at 45, 55.
151. Id. at 55.
152. Id.
153. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 199 (1980) (explaining that
Hohfeldian relations are actually “three-term[ed],” consisting of the two parties to the
relation and some “act-description signifying some act”).
154. Alan Ross Anderson, The Logic of Hohfeldian Propositions, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 29,
31 (1971).
155. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 230
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from the states or a branch of the federal government.156 The Constitution’s powergranting provisions relate almost entirely to the federal government since the states
are assumed to possess the powers they wield unless the Constitution has assigned
them exclusively to the federal government or withheld them altogether.157 Thus,
the Constitution enumerates the powers of Congress while assuming that state
legislatures possess a general reserved power to legislate,158 and expressly denying
certain powers to both.159
An array of Hohfeldian relationships is evident in the constitutional text, and
Hohfeldian analysis is common in contemporary constitutional literature.160 The
(1982); TRIBE, supra note 82, § 2–1, at 118–19; Esbeck, supra note 4, at 4, 8; Rosenkranz,
supra note 4, at 1023; THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (“The regular distribution of power into distinct departments . . . are means, and
powerful means, by which the excellencies of republican government may be retained and its
imperfections lessened or avoided.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 323 (James Madison)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“Having reviewed the general form of the proposed
government, and the general mass of power allotted to it: I proceed to examine the particular
structure of this government, and the distribution of this mass of power among its constituent
parts.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(“[T]he power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments,
and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments.”).
156. See TRIBE, supra note 82, § 2–3, at 124–26 (“[G]overnment structure [is the]
allocation of power.”); ERNEST A. YOUNG, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE 621–22 (2012); Esbeck, supra note 4, at 3 (“Structural clauses are helpfully
thought of as power-conferring or power-limiting[;] . . . many such clauses serve both
functions.”); e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) (“[T]he Commerce Clause is
a structural provision allocating authority between federal and state sovereignties.”)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
157. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”); TRIBE, supra note 82, § 2–1, at 119.
158. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”), with Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722
(1877) (holding that the states of the United States “possess and exercise the authority of
independent States . . . except as restrained and limited” by the Constitution).
159. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed.”); id. § 10 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law,
or Law impairing the obligation of Contracts . . . .”); see also Jay S. Bybee, Common
Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the First Amendment, 75
TUL. L. REV. 251, 314–15 (2000) [hereinafter Bybee, Common Ground] (summarizing the
Constitution’s “principal focus” as “the distribution of power within a new federal
government, the relationship between the new federal government and existing state
governments, and the withdrawal of power from federal and state governments”).
160. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1119, 1125–26 (1990); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 392–93
(1999); Bybee, Taking Liberties, supra note 127, at 1546–66; Bybee, Common Ground,
supra note 159, at 315–28; I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to
Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1140 n.8 (2008); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights
and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 344 & n.4 (1993); Ronald R. Garet,
Three Concepts of Church Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1349, 1354–56, 1369–70; Louis L.
Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff,
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disability/immunity relationship in particular maps easily onto structural
constitutional restraints; these function precisely as disabilities, limiting the federal
or a state government’s reach by denying it sovereign power to perform certain acts
relating to certain subject matters. Constitutional disabilities on government action
necessarily create correlative constitutional immunities from the consequences of
actions that exceed the bounds of the disability.161
For example, it is a commonplace that federalism protects personal liberty.162
Private plaintiffs as well as the states have standing to challenge federal
government action for injuries suffered when it transgresses the structural limits
expressed or implied by constitutional text or the federal system.163 In Hohfeldian
116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and
Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 119, 122 & n.20, 135–37 (2009) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Religious
Institutions]; Gregory E. Maggs, Innovation in Constitutional Law: The Right to Education
and the Tricks of the Trade, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1038, 1048–49 (1992); William T. Mayton,
“Buying-Up Speech”: Active Government and the Terms of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 373, 373 (1994); Simeon C.R. McIntosh, On
Reading the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Raoul Berger, 28 HOW. L.J. 913, 921–24 (1985);
H. Newcomb Morse, Applying the Hohfeld System to Constitutional Analysis, 9 WHITTIER L.
REV. 639 (1988); Allen Thomas O’Rourke, Refuge from a Jurisprudence of Doubt:
Hohfeldian Analysis of Constitutional Law, 61 S.C. L. REV. 141 (2009); Samuel C. Rickless,
The Right to Privacy Unveiled, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 773, 77–80 (2007); Frederick Schauer,
Hohfeld’s First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 914 (2008); Howard M. Wasserman,
Jurisdiction, Merits, and Non-Extant Rights, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 227, 232–34 (2008);
Gordon G. Young, Justifying Motive Analysis in Judicial Review, 17 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 191, 256–57 (2008); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972)
(citing Jaffe, supra).
161. Bybee, Common Ground, supra note 159, at 318–22; Bybee, Taking Liberties, supra
note 127, at 1547–50; see also Cook, supra note 147, at 726–27; Garet, supra note 160, at
1354–55; Lupu & Tuttle, Religious Institutions, supra note 160, at 122–23 & n.20; Maggs,
supra note 160, at 1048–49; cf. Rickless, supra note 160, at 775–79.
Hohfeld himself identified the Contracts Clause, “No State shall pass any Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1 (ellipses omitted), as
having created a disability/immunity relationship. See Hohfeld, supra note 146, at 57. This
text disables the states from enacting legislation that alters or interferes with contractual
obligations; parties to and beneficiaries of those obligations are correspondingly immune
from legislation that purports to alter or interfere with their performance or enforcement.
162. E.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“Federalism . . . protects
the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated
governmental power cannot direct or control their actions.”); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
diffusion of sovereign power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 45, at 309 (James Madison) (deriding the idea that the Revolution was fought to restore
the “dignities and attributes of [state] sovereignty” rather than to ensure personal “peace,
liberty and safety”); MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN, STEVEN G. CALABRESI, MICHAEL W.
MCCONNELL & SAMUEL L. BRAY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 45 (2010)
(“The Constitution’s structure—separation of powers, federalism—is designed in part to
promote individual liberty, as well as effective, limited government.”).
163. E.g., Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2363–64 (“The individual, in a proper case, can assert
injury from governmental action taken in excess of the authority that federalism defines. Her
rights in this regard do not belong to a State. . . . [A]llocation of powers between the
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terms, the disabilities that federalism imposes on federal action immunize
individuals as well as the states from the consequences of such action when it
violates the limits set by such disabilities, and empowers both states and individuals
as immunity-holders to challenge violations of those limits.164
B. Establishment Clause Disability and Immunities
1. One Disability, Two Immunities
The Establishment Clause originally disabled the federal government from
enacting laws “respecting an establishment of religion.”165 This disability generated
two immunities, one held by the states against federal interference in state decisions
to establish or disestablish religion, and one held by the people against the adverse
legal consequences that would flow from federal establishment of a national
church.
a. Federal Disability
The Establishment Clause has been widely characterized as a structural restraint
that denies to government the power to act with respect to certain subject matters
involving religion.166 One of the first such references is an early twentieth-century
National Government and the States enhances freedom, first by protecting the integrity of the
governments themselves, and second by protecting the people, from whom all governmental
powers are derived.”).
164. Id. at 2364 (“States are not the sole intended beneficiaries of federalism. An
individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance
between the National Government and the States when the enforcement of those laws causes
injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable. Fidelity to principles of federalism is not
for the States alone to vindicate.” (citation omitted)). Private plaintiffs have standing to
challenge violations of the separation of federal powers for the same reason. E.g., INS v
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935–36 (1983).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
166. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 243, 244 (1997) (explaining that the
Establishment Clause’s “flat ban on subsidization” of government by religion is a “structural
and libertarian guarantee[]”) (Souter, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589–90
(1992) (explaining that the Establishment Clause restricts government action even when the
action does not interfere with minority free exercise); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
294–98 (1901) (explaining that the Establishment Clause and the rest of the First
Amendment constitute an absolute prohibition on congressional power to legislate); Lamont
v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he basic structure of the Establishment
Clause, which imposes a restriction on Congress, differs markedly from that of the Fourth
Amendment, which confers a right on the people. . . . [T]he constitutional prohibition against
establishments of religion targets the competency of Congress to enact legislation of that
description—irrespective of time or place.”); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 94 (1980) (“[P]art of the point of combining these cross-cutting commands [of the
Religion Clauses] was to make sure the church and the government gave each other
breathing space: the provision thus performs a structural or separation of powers function.”);
REX E. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CONSTITUTION 129 (1981) (“The underlying concepts
of the two religion guarantees are quite different. The free-exercise clause is analogous to
other First Amendment provisions; its function is to secure free choice in religious matters
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dictum in Downes v. Bidwell.167 Considering whether the Uniform Duties Clause
applied to imports from “unincorporated” territories,168 Downes contrasted that
question with the absolute character of certain of the Constitution’s other denials of
federal power:
There is a clear distinction between such prohibitions as go to the very
root of the power of Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place,
and such as are operative only “throughout the United States” or among
the several States.
Thus, when the Constitution declares that “no bill of attainder or ex
post facto law shall be passed,” and that “no title nobility shall be
granted by the United States,” it goes to the competency of Congress to
pass a bill of that description.169
The Court went on to suggest that “the same remark may apply to the 1st
Amendment,” including the Establishment Clause.170
against governmental intrusions,” whereas “the establishment clause deals with structural
matters.”); Esbeck, supra note 4, at 6, 21 (“Remedies tailored to relieving plaintiffs of
injuries actually suffered are indicative of an individual rights clause,” whereas under the
Establishment Clause, “courts have enjoined government from acting in an entire field of
concerns deemed to be in the exclusive province of religion. . . . [F]rom its inception the
Establishment Clause . . . had the role of a structural clause rather than a rights-based
clause.”); Lupu & Tuttle, Religious Institutions, supra note 160, at 122–23 (“[T]he
Constitution disables civil courts from resolving certain classes of questions. This is an
adjudicative disability, not a right of autonomy, and it rest[s] on the Establishment
Clause . . . .”); Meier, supra note 4, at 164 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has tended to view the
[Establishment] Clause as more of a structural provision rather than as a clause protecting
individual rights.”); Jessica Powley Hayden, Note, The Ties That Bind: The Constitution,
Structural Restraints, and Government Action Overseas, 96 GEO. L.J. 237, 243 (2007) (“One
of the [Establishment] Clause’s central purposes was to manage federal power vis-à-vis the
states. . . . Although the Religion Clauses, working in tandem, embody an individual right of
religious freedom, the prohibition on establishment was meant to act as a prohibition on
government action, not as a specific right held by the people.”); Note, Rethinking
Incorporation, supra note 4, at 1710 (The Establishment Clause “is a structural limit upon
federal power and a reservation of authority to the states.”).
167. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.”).
169. Downes, 182 U.S. at 277 (emphasis in original).
170. Id. Three Justices concurring in the five-Justice majority were even more emphatic,
describing the Establishment Clause and other First Amendment norms as “absolute
withdrawals of power which the Constitution has made in favor of human liberty,” which
“are applicable to every condition or status .” Id. at 297–98 (White., J., joined by Shiras &
McKenna, JJ., concurring) (citing Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S.
542 (1885)); accord Thomas Jefferson, Resolutions Adopted by the Kentucky General
Assembly, Res. III (Nov. 10, 1798), in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1 JANUARY
1798 TO 31 JANUARY 1799, at 550, 550–51 (2003) (The First Amendment confirms that the
Constitution afforded the federal government “no power” over the freedoms of religion,
speech, or press, so that “libels, falsehoods, and defamation, equally with heresy and false
religion, are withheld from the cognizance of federal tribunals. That therefore the [Sedition
Act] which does abridge the freedom of the press, is not law, but is altogether void and of no
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Courts and commentators have since reconceptualized most provisions of the
First Amendment as personal rights rather than structural disabilities.171 The
Establishment Clause, however, continues to be understood as a structural
limitation that wholly disables government from establishing religion.172 Unlike
violations of personal rights, for example, Establishment Clause violations may not
be counterbalanced by weighty government interests173 or subjected to equitable
defenses like waiver.174 The Supreme Court has even suggested that in some
effect.”).
171. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[N]o
liberty is more essential to the continued vitality of the free society which our Constitution
guarantees than is the religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause explicit in the
First Amendment and imbedded in the Fourteenth.”); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707
(1931) (“It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press, and of speech, is within
the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
invasion by state action. It was found impossible to conclude that this essential personal
liberty of the citizen was left unprotected by the general guaranty of fundamental rights of
person and property.”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present
purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press . . . are among the
fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”); LEE, supra note 166, at 129
(“[F]ree-exercise problems arise in the standard First Amendment individual-rights
context.”).
172. See, e.g., Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 (2d Cir. 1991) (Downes “suggested
that the constitutional prohibition against establishments of religion targets the competency
of Congress to enact legislation of that description—irrespective of time and place.”); LEE,
supra note 166, at 129 (The Establishment Clause “has a different thrust” than the Free
Exercise Clause: “Unlike any other First Amendment provision, [it] deals with structural
matters, specifically the relationships between government and religious institutions or
religious movements.”).
173. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992) (holding that Establishment
Clause violations may not be balanced against majoritarian preferences); Colo. Christian
Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (opinion by McConnell, J.) (holding
that all Establishment Clause violations except those involving religious discrimination are
“flatly forbidden without reference to the strength of governmental purposes”); Esbeck,
supra note 4, at 2–3 (“For government to avoid violating a right is a matter of constitutional
duty owed to each individual within its jurisdiction. On the other hand, for government to
avoid exceeding a structural restraint is a matter of limiting its activities and laws to the
scope of its powers.”); Lupu & Tuttle, Religious Institutions, supra note 160, at 129 (“[A]n
Establishment Clause–anchored doctrine of ministerial exemption . . . would admit of no
interest-balancing whatsoever . . . .”); see also LEE, supra note 166, at 129 (Unlike
Establishment Clause doctrine, free exercise doctrine “balanc[es] governmental interests
against individual interests.”).
174. See, e.g., Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that majority student vote to allow graduation prayer could not waive constitutional
limitations imposed by Establishment Clause), vacated as moot, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995);
EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 856 F. Supp. 1, 12–13 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding sua sponte
that court lacked jurisdiction under Establishment Clause to adjudicate theological questions
despite failure of either party to raise issue), aff’d, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Johnson v.
Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421, 432 n. 32 (D. Conn. 1970) (“The Establishment Clause is the
guardian of the interests of society as a whole and is particularly invested with the rights of
minorities. It cannot be ‘waived’ by individuals or institutions, any more than the
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circumstances the Establishment Clause disability functions like a denial of
subject-matter jurisdiction,175 as to which questions of interest-balancing and equity
unconstitutionality of state-prescribed school prayers could be ‘waived’ by certain pupils
absenting themselves from the classroom while they were conducted.”), aff’d mem., 403 U.S.
955 (1971); Lupu & Tuttle, Religious Institutions, supra note 160, at 135–36, 146
(“[Establishment Clause limitations] cannot be waived or conferred by consent of the
parties. . . . For example, even if all of the parents in a public school district agreed to permit
official prayers in the schools, the practice would still violate the Establishment
Clause . . . . Similarly, a congregation’s waiver of the ministerial exception should not vest a
court with jurisdiction to decide on the quality of a minister’s job performance.”); Laurence
H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the
Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 333 n.14 (1985) (“[The Establishment
Clause] gives rise to rights that are clearly not subject to waiver or alienation by any
individual—certainly not by a recipient of government aid to religion, or by a citizentaxpayer who is the source of such aid. Thus it is plain that a church or church-related school
could not, for example, ‘waive’ the right to avoid intrusive governmental entanglement in
order to receive direct monetary aid from the public treasury.”); Kimberly A. Yuracko,
Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV.
123, 153–54 (2008) (“Many, if not most, constitutional rights are waivable by their intended
beneficiaries. . . . Permitting waiver of a constitutional right makes sense when the
justification for the right is primarily to bolster and reinforce the autonomy of the right
holder and where permitting waiver does not undermine any larger social goals. However,
waiver does not make sense, and is not permissible, when constitutional rights and
obligations are intended to serve broader social functions, such as establishing a particular
structure of government or reinforcing foundational social norms. . . . [T]he Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment ensures a government in which church and state are separate.
The goals and benefits of the Establishment Clause are primarily social and structural, not
individual. As such, individuals may not choose to waive the protections of the
Establishment Clause.”). But see Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Horne, 698 F.3d 1295, 1301–02 (10th Cir. 2012) (upholding laches defense to
Establishment Clause claim and vacating lower court determination that structural limits set
by the Clause were not subject to waiver).
175. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
713–14 (1976) (explaining that courts may “exercise no jurisdiction” over a “subject matter”
involving “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the
conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.”)
(quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733–34 (1871) (emphasis omitted));
accord Dowd v. Soc’y of St. Columbans, 861 F.2d 761, 764 (1st Cir. 1988); Catholic Univ.,
856 F. Supp. at 12–13; Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 683 A.2d 808, 811 (Md. Ct.
App. 1996); Gaydos v. Blaeuer, 81 S.W.3d 186, 192–93 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Cha v. Korean
Presbyterian Church, 553 S.E.2d 511, 514–15 (Va. 2001); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese, 533
N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995); Esbeck, supra note 4, at 42–43; see Garet, supra note 160, at
1355–56 (suggesting that if Establishment Clause violations were waivable, the Clause
would represent a right/duty rather than an immunity/disability relationship). The absolute
character of a structural disability does not fit with the conditional character of a group right
to church autonomy, whose violation may be waived by the group right-holder or otherwise
permitted if closely related to a weighty government interest. Frederick Mark Gedicks,
Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence in Hosanna-Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV. 405
(2013); Lupu & Tuttle, Religious Institutions, supra note 160, at 135.
The Court had traditionally rested this limitation on the First Amendment generally
rather than in the Religion Clauses or the Establishment Clause alone, perhaps to preserve
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are obviously irrelevant. These doctrines would not make sense if the
Establishment Clause protected a personal right like the free exercise of religion,176
but they fit nicely with a structural conception of the Clause as a denial of
government power.
Anti-incorporationists commonly characterize the Establishment Clause as a
structural restraint that reserved power to the states.177 This is correct as far as it
goes; a reservation of state power over a subject matter impliedly immunizes the
people against federal action relating to that subject matter. Characterizing the
Establishment Clause as a reservation of state power nevertheless obscures the full
meaning and effect of the Clause. Denying the federal government sovereign power
over religious establishments not only protected the states by leaving them free to
exercise their power to establish or disestablish religion but also ensured that the
people would not suffer the adverse legal effects of a federally established religion.
This is evident from the text, which disables Congress rather than merely
reserving state power. The Establishment Clause does not read like that
quintessential reservation of state power, the Tenth Amendment (and even the
Tenth Amendment reserves power to the people as well as the states).178 A
reservation of state power over religious establishments would have looked
something like, “The power to pass laws respecting an establishment of religion,
not having been delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited
by it to the States, is reserved to the States.” By contrast, the language of the Clause
goes beyond reserving power to the states to affirmatively deny power to Congress.
A textual reservation of power to the states would have only implicitly protected
the people from federal action, whereas the actual text of the Clause expressly
disabling Congress puts each of the states and the people on equal textual footing
as direct beneficiaries of the disability.
As ratified in 1791, the Establishment Clause was a particular case of a more
general and widespread understanding of the liberty-protecting effect of the
the freedom of association implicit in the Speech Clause as part of the exception’s doctrinal
foundation. In Hosanna-Tabor, however, the Court expressly rejected the freedom of
association as a basis for the ministerial exception, instead resting the exception on a
religious group right to church autonomy under the Free Exercise Clause and on a structural
disability on theological entanglement under the Establishment Clause. Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 704–07 (2012).
176. Free exercise rights are subject to balancing and may be waived by their holders.
See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(holding that state action targeting a particular religion may be upheld if narrowly tailored to
a compelling government interest).
177. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1158 (1991); Conkle, supra note 4, at 1133; Glendon & Yanes, supra note 4, at 481–82;
Lietzau, supra note 4, at 1201–02; McClellan, supra note 4, at 295; Muñoz, supra note 4, at
631–32; Rosenkranz, supra note 4, at 1060; Doshi, supra note 4, at 467; Hilton, supra note
4, at 1707; Kruse, supra note 4, at 66; see also SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note
4, at 18 ( “[The Religion Clauses were] simply an assignment of jurisdiction over matters of
religion to the states—no more, no less.”).
178. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion”), with id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
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Constitution’s allocations of sovereign power.179 As is well known, Federalists
maintained that because the Constitution nowhere delegated to Congress any power
over religious subject matters, Congress lacked the power to do any of the things
that anti-Federalists feared, such as establish a national church, interfere with state
decisions to establish or disestablish religion, or burden religious conscience. The
Establishment Clause confirmed the disability implicit in constitutional structure by
expressly denying to Congress the power to enact laws pursuant to its enumerated
powers respecting the establishment or disestablishment of religion at the federal or
state level, thereby generating immunities in both the states and the people.180
b. State Immunity
As anti-incorporationists routinely argue, the Establishment Clause disability
immunized the states from congressional attempts to interfere with state
establishment or disestablishment of religion. The constitutional disability, which
prevented Congress from passing any “law respecting an establishment of
religion,” inoculated the states against the legal consequences of any federal law
that purported to alter the legal status or relations of state-established or statedisestablished religions.
c. Personal Immunity
The congressional disability imposed by the Establishment Clause, however, did
not immunize only the states. There is also consensus that the Clause was originally
understood to restrain the federal government from constituting a church with the
powers, privileges, and characteristics of eighteenth-century national churches like
the Church of England;181 even anti-incorporationists agree that besides disabling

179. See supra notes 155–56, 162–64 and accompanying text.
180. Cf. GREENAWALT, RELIGION, supra note 6, at 29 (arguing that the Establishment
Clause was originally understood to have deprived the federal government not only of
jurisdiction over state establishment or disestablishment of religion, but also to have imposed
a substantive prohibition against establishing a national church); McClellan, supra note 4, at
295, 314–15 (arguing that the Establishment Clause embodied dual purposes of protecting
state prerogatives over religious establishment and disestablishment and protecting
individuals from encroachments on personal liberty by a national church); Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1505–
06 (1987) [hereinafter McConnell, Federalism] (book review) (same); see also ELLIS M.
WEST, THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 22 (2011) (“[A] constitutional
provision may deny a government jurisdiction over a certain subject/domain for two entirely
different reasons—to protect states’ rights or to protect a natural right . . . .” (emphasis in
original)); Bybee, Taking Liberties, supra note 127, at 1549–50, 1557 (arguing that the entire
First Amendment constituted a disability on Congress that generated both state and personal
immunities).
181. See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 89 (3d ed. 2010); Feldman, supra note 71, at 398–99; Green,
A Reassessment, supra note 111, at 767–68; Greenawalt, Common Sense, supra note 6, at
488, 491; Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6, at 1088–89; McConnell, Federalism,
supra note 180, at 1506.
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Congress from interfering with state establishment and disestablishment, the Clause
also disabled Congress from establishing a national religion.182 This substantive
disability on establishing a national religion logically correlates to an immunity in
the people of the United States from any legal consequences purportedly generated
by a national religious establishment. The eighteenth-century founders feared a
national religious establishment that would impose on personal religious
conscience and practice, and not just the intrusions it might have imposed on state
relationships with religion.
* * *
The Establishment Clause was originally understood as a disability on
congressional action, not simply as a reservation of state power. This disability left
the states free to effect religious establishment or disestablishment without
congressional interference, but it also left the people as well as the states free of the
consequences of federally established religion; the disability, in other words,
created both state and personal immunities from congressional action.183 The
Establishment Clause’s protection of personal liberty thus did not “evolve” beyond
the Clause’s original structural limitation, as argued by most defenders of
incorporation,184 but was present from the beginning in the personal immunity
logically correlated to the Clause’s structural disability.
2. Act-Description
The congressional disability and the state and personal immunities created by
the Establishment Clause have an act-description that delineates their scope.
Identifying the prohibited act is easy: the Clause disables Congress from using its
legislative power—“Congress shall pass no law”—and the state and individual
immunities consequently insulate their holders from the legal effects of
congressional acts.
It is more complicated to describe the subject matter of those laws that Congress
is disabled from passing—laws “respecting an establishment of religion.” The
original meaning of “establishment of religion” remains highly contested, and those
disagreements cannot be resolved here. Nor is it necessary to do so; it is enough to
show that the Establishment Clause encompassed substantive prohibitions as
opposed to purely jurisdictional ones.
Virtually all Establishment Clause scholars agree that whatever else it entailed,
the original meaning of the Clause encompassed at least one substantive
prohibition—that against a national church like the eighteenth-century Church of

182. E.g., AMAR, supra note 4, at 32; SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 4, at
23; Glendon & Yanes, supra note 4, at 497; Knicely, supra note 4, at 219; Kurland, supra
note 4, at 9; McClellan, supra note 4, at 295, 314–15; Muñoz, supra note 4, at 630; Paulsen,
supra note 4, at 317; Porth & George, supra note 4, at 136–37; Steven D. Smith, The
Jurisdictional Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843, 1871
(2006) [hereinafter Smith, Jurisdictional Establishment Clause]; Doshi, supra note 4, at 467;
Kruse, supra note 4, at 77, 85–87; Note, Rethinking Incorporation, supra note 4, at 1707; see
supra notes 58 (Snee) & 76 (Thomas) and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Part I.D.
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England.185 Accordingly, one may posit as the subject-matter prohibition of the
Establishment Clause the general attributes of the “establishment of religion” or
established church as that concept was understood in the late eighteenth century.
An eighteenth-century “establishment of religion” generally possessed some
measure of political or governmental power that privileged its members and
burdened dissenters and nonmembers;186 it received land grants, tax monies, and
other financial assistance directly from the government to support devotional and
other unambiguously religious activities;187 and it was subject to governmental
regulation of its leadership and liturgy.188 The Establishment Clause thus prohibited
(at least) federal funding and control of a particular religion, as well as that
religion’s exercise of federal power.
Using federal power, funding, and control to define the act-description, one can
understand the Establishment Clause disability on Congress as correlatively
immunizing (i) the states from the effects of congressional legislation purporting to
require or prohibit the exercise of state power by churches, state funding of
churches, or state control of churches, and (ii) the people and their congregations
from the effects of congressional legislation purporting to authorize the exercise of
federal power by a church, federal funding of a church, or federal control of a
church. This dual reading of the Establishment Clause as prohibiting both federally
established religion and federal interference with state establishment and
disestablishment of religion is overwhelmingly accepted as the original
understanding of the Clause upon its ratification in 1791.189

185. See supra text accompanying notes 59, 181–82.
186. See, e.g., CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, ARTHUR T. DOWNEY & EDWARD C. ROBERTS,
FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT 1–2, 4–20, 24–29 (1964); Lupu & Tuttle,
Federalism & Faith, supra note 28, at 27; Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and
Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2105, 2131, 2144–46, 2159–76 (2003) [hereinafter McConnell, Establishment].
187. See, e.g., ANTIEAU ET AL., supra note 186, at 1, 20–24; Lupu & Tuttle, Federalism &
Faith, supra note 28, at 27; McConnell, Establishment, supra note 186, at 2131, 2146–59.
188. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, Federalism & Faith, supra note 28, at 27; McConnell,
Establishment, supra note 186, at 2131–44.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 59, 181–82. This dual reading was the subject of
an exchange between Kent Greenawalt and Steven Smith about whether the Establishment
Clause prohibition was substantive as well as jurisdictional. See Greenawalt, Common Sense,
supra note 6; Smith, Jurisdictional Establishment Clause, supra note 182; see also WEST,
supra note 180, at 2–3, 29–36 (criticizing Smith on similar grounds). Greenawalt shows how
a substantive reading of the Clause would have prohibited Congress from establishing but
not disestablishing religion in federal enclaves such as U.S. territories, the District of
Columbia, or U.S. military camps or forts, whereas a jurisdictional limitation would have
prohibited both establishment and disestablishment by Congress in such enclaves.
Greenawalt, Common Sense, supra note 6, at 481–86. As Greenawalt suggests, it seems
unlikely that the Framers who drafted the Establishment Clause or the public that ratified it
intended to prevent the federal government from disestablishing religion in such enclaves.
Id. at 498–99.
Professor Smith attempts to salvage the jurisdictional reading by characterizing it as
“two-way” in the states—that is, Congress was disabled from interfering with state decisions
to establish or to disestablish religion in the states—but only “one-way” in federal
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C. Establishment Clause Incorporation
1. Incorporation Logic
Though anti-incorporationists generally acknowledge that the Establishment
Clause prohibited Congress from establishing a national church, they seem not to
appreciate its logical significance in the incorporation debate. Arguments about the
incoherence of Establishment Clause incorporation implicitly presuppose that the
Clause encompasses only the state immunity. Indeed, anti-incorporationists are
incredulous that incorporation could have converted a reservation of state power
into a limitation on state power.190
enclaves—that is, Congress was disabled from establishing religion in such enclaves, but not
from disestablishing it, should the need to do so have ever arisen. Smith, Jurisdictional
Establishment Clause, supra note 182, at 1851–53.
This Article assumes that the Establishment Clause originally prevented the federal
government from establishing a national religion. Whether this is a substantive prohibition or
a one-way jurisdictional limitation is immaterial.
190. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 4, at 34 (“The original establishment clause . . . is
agnostic on the substantive issue of establishment versus nonestablishment and simply calls
for the issue to be decided locally. . . . But how can such a local option clause be
mechanically incorporated against localities . . . ?” (emphasis in original)); BRADLEY, supra
note 4, at 95 (“How does one translate ‘Congress shall not interfere with state practices’ into
a command to state governments?”); DREISBACH, supra note 4, at 94–95 (“The modern
Supreme Court, in pursuit of its objective to ‘nationalize’ the Bill of Rights, has
systematically denied th[e] central [federalism] purpose of the religion clauses . . . .”); KATZ,
supra note 4, at 11 (“The only thing we really know about the original meaning of the ‘no
establishment’ clause is that it forbade Congress to disestablish as well as to establish
religion. And the Fourteenth Amendment certainly did not extend this prohibition to the
states!” (emphasis in original)); O’NEILL, supra note 3, at 162 (Since the Establishment
Clause protected against a federally established religion, holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects against a federally established religion created by a state legislature is
“a complete absurdity which probably no justice of the Supreme Court will ever express in
so many words.”); SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 4, at 24 (“[I]t seems
nonsensical or incoherent to suggest that a provision representing ‘essential federalism’ has
[a] substantive content that can be ‘extended’ to the states.”); Brose, supra note 4, at 5
(“Everson . . . stated, without any analysis whatsoever, that the same reasons for which the
Court incorporated the free exercise clause gave it ‘every reason’ to do the same with the
Establishment Clause. With such ease did the Court turn the Establishment Clause on its
head.” (footnote omitted)); Conkle, supra note 4, at 1141 (“[T]he establishment clause, as
originally understood . . . embraced only a policy of federalism on the subject of church and
state. To ‘incorporate’ this policy of states’ rights for application against the states would be
utter nonsense . . . .” (emphasis in original)); Glendon & Yanes, supra note 4, at 481 (“[I]t is
striking in retrospect to observe how little intellectual curiosity the members of the Court
demonstrated in the challenge presented by the task of adapting, for application to the states,
[Establishment Clause] language that had long served to protect the states against the federal
government.”); Kurland, supra note 4, at 9–10 (“[N]othing in the history of the fourteenth
amendment suggests that [Establishment Clause incorporation] was among its purposes or
goals. The transmogrification occurred solely at the whim of the Court . . . without cogent
argument.”); Lietzau, supra note 4, at 1206 (“The only ‘right’ embodied in the clause would
be the right to have one’s state free to establish a religion. It is thus nonsensical to
incorporate the establishment clause . . . .”); Paulsen, supra note 4, at 317–18 (“[I]t makes no
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The fallacy of this argument is its assumption that the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause is fully captured by the state immunity. An extension of the
state immunity to limit state action would obviously have been incoherent. But,
there was nothing incoherent about extinguishing the state immunity and extending
the personal immunity to limit state as well as federal power respecting religious
establishments, especially in a historical context like Reconstruction when
Congress was preoccupied with imposing additional constitutional limitations on
the states. As the Supreme Court observed in 1879, the Reconstruction amendments
and the federal legislation they enabled were intended as “limitations of the power
of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress.”191
The Fourteenth Amendment can be logically understood to have eliminated that
portion of the Establishment Clause disability that denied power to Congress to
pass laws affecting state religious establishment and disestablishment, while
leaving intact the remainder of the congressional disability against creating a
national church, and enlarging it to include a state-established religion.
Correlatively, the Amendment eliminated the state immunity from federal laws
respecting state establishment or disestablishment of religion, while leaving intact
the personal immunity against a national church and enlarging it to an immunity
against all government action establishing religion, federal and state.
In short, incorporation enlarged the boundaries of Establishment Clause
disability from no federal law vesting federal authority, assistance, or control in a
religion to no law vesting government authority, assistance, or control in a religion.
Or, what amounts to the same thing, incorporation eliminated any immunity owing
to states under the Establishment Clause and extended the personal immunity from
the legal consequences of national establishments to those of state establishments
as well. Whether this construction of Establishment Clause incorporation can be
textually and historically defended remains to be demonstrated,192 but it is not
illogical.

more sense to ‘incorporate’ [the Establishment Clause] against the states than it does to
incorporate the other provisions in the Bill of Rights which are federalism-oriented.
Undaunted, the Supreme Court forced a square historical peg into a round doctrinal hole by
filing off a few of the more inconvenient sharp edges of history.” (footnote and parentheses
omitted)); Porth & George, supra note 4, at 139 (“[T]he establishment clause not only
restricts the power of the federal government, it specifically protects a popular prerogative in
the states. It is logically impossible to turn such a protection on its head and make it a
prohibition.”); Snee, supra note 3, at 389 (“By what magical metamorphosis does a clause
which, under the First Amendment, is expressly a reservation of power to the states, become
a denial of that very power by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment?”); Note, Rethinking
Incorporation, supra note 4, at 1709 (“As originally understood, the Establishment Clause
prevented the federal government from interfering with state authority over religion.
However, incorporation achieves the opposite result—the elimination of such authority.”).
191. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880); see also CURTIS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 20, at 54 (“[M]any Republicans wanted personal liberty and personal rights
placed in the keeping of the nation and protected from local legislation.”).
192. See infra Parts II.C.2, III.
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2. Incorporation Texts
For application of the Establishment Clause to the states to make textual sense,
there must be a Fourteenth Amendment text that can reasonably be understood to
have actually effected that application. The textual vehicles available for
Establishment Clause incorporation are the Due Process and Privileges and
Immunities Clauses.193 Accordingly, a plausible textual account of incorporation
must offer a definition of the Establishment Clause disability that sounds in
“liberty,” “privilege,” or “immunity.” Again, anti-incorporationists deride
suggestions that the structural Establishment Clause could protect any of these.194
The anti-incorporationist error here is the assumption that no one stands on the
other side of a structural limitation,195 no “beneficiary,” to use Professor Conkle’s

193. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
194. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 4, at 42 (“How could a structural clause designed to
promote federalism and ‘states rights’ be incorporated as a fundamental individual liberty
under the Due Process Clause . . . ? How did the Court explain this paradox . . . ? As Horace
Rumpole . . . might say: ‘[A]nswer came there none.’”) (alteration in original); Knicely,
supra note 4, at 175 (“[T]he criticism that Everson’s incorporation of the Clause against the
states required ‘a constitutional wrench’ in order ‘to squeeze a structural clause into a
‘liberty mold’ remains as unanswered today as it did when it was made more than fifty years
ago.”) (quoting Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 25, 41 (1962)); Lietzau, supra note 4, at 1206–07 (“The individual right involved [in
Establishment Clause incorporation], namely religious liberty, is ‘protected’ by the clause
only through its ability to prevent federal frustration of local legislative competence in
religious matters. A court injunction against state action is exactly the frustration the
establishment clause attempted to preclude.”); McClellan, supra note 4, at 316 (“[T]he
application of the establishment clause to the states through the due process clause requires a
rather bizarre juggling of words and artful manipulation of legal and historical precedents.”);
Snee, supra note 3, at 406 (“A clause which in effect told the states . . . that they had all
power over religion so far as the Constitution was concerned, cannot . . . be read into the
word ‘liberty’ of the Fourteenth Amendment to mean that they have no power.”) (emphasis
in original); Hilton, supra note 4, at 1706 (“Insofar as the only Bill of Rights provisions that
are candidates for incorporation . . . are those that guarantee individual rights, the
Establishment Clause was never an appropriate candidate for incorporation. . . . The
structural ‘square peg’ cannot fit into the liberty ‘round hole’ . . . .”); Note, Rethinking
Incorporation, supra note 4, at 1710 (“[The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause]
purports to protect individuals from deprivations of ‘liberty.’ . . . [But] the Establishment
Clause is not a provision of individual liberty at all. Rather, it is a structural limit upon
federal power and a reservation of authority to the states.”); see also MARK DEWOLFE HOWE,
THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 72–73 (1965) (“[I]t seems to me extraordinarily difficult to take
seriously the suggestion that the framers and the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
believed that its adoption was going to have a significant effect upon the country’s religious
institutions. . . . [I]t is not easy to see how . . . laws of the state which, although they may
respect an establishment, do not deny liberty can be made into unconstitutional deprivations
of liberty.”).
195. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 147, at 51 (explaining that Hohfeldian analysis enables
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term,196 or a state but no individual beneficiary, as maintained by Justice Thomas
and Professor Amar.197 The enlarged personal immunity from federal and state
establishments, however, reasonably falls under the definitional umbrella of either
a personal liberty or an immunity of citizenship.198
a. Due Process
The Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause against the states
through the Due Process Clause as perhaps the earliest instance of “selective
incorporation.”199 The Due Process Clause provides that no state shall “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”200
It is hardly a textual stretch to include a personal immunity correlated with a
government disability under the umbrella of due process liberty.201 Immunities
designate fields of action in which government is not permitted to alter the legal
status or relationships of an immunity holder acting in that field.202 It is difficult to
imagine, then, how an immunity would not fall within the definition of a liberty
interest for purposes of incorporation through the Due Process Clause. Indeed, one
of Hohfeld’s achievements was to demonstrate how the domain of liberty exceeded
that of rights—that is, that the areas of individual freedom protected by “rights” do
not exhaust the areas protected by “liberty.”203 Constitutional provisions that
prohibit the federal and state governments from acting in certain fields leave
individuals free to act in those fields as they choose without government
interference, and thus presumptively protect personal liberty.204
In short, that the Establishment Clause was originally understood as a structural
limitation rather than a personal right did not preclude its incorporation against the
states as part of the substantive liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
Fourteenth Amendment enlargement of the domain of unrestricted individual action
through the Establishment Clause—by extending the personal immunity to state as
well as federal establishments—fits comfortably within any plausible definition of
due process liberty.
analytic criticism of those “who speak of rights without reference to their correlative duties,
or power without reference to correlative liabilities”).
196. Conkle, supra note 4, at 1140.
197. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50–51 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); AMAR, supra note 4, at 34.
198. Or both. See AMAR, supra note 4, at 172 (describing Justice Black’s theory of
incorporation “as a whole” based on all of the clauses in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
199. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148–49 & n.14 (1968).
200. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
201. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Part II.A.1.
203. Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 988; see also Pound, supra note 147, at 571–
72, 575 (noting Austin’s distinction between “right” and “liberty”).
204. Though the presumption may be rebutted: The absence of government power
sometimes enables private exploitation of persons whom government has an obligation to
protect. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973,
973–74 (1991).
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b. Privileges or Immunities
An additional text for applying the Establishment Clause against the states is the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, which prohibits the states from abridging the
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”205 A personal immunity
from the legal consequences of governmentally established religions reasonably
falls within the textual meaning of an immunity of citizenship.206 Although the
Privileges or Immunities Clause does not expressly disable state governments from
establishing religion, this disability is logically present if the individual immunity
against the legal consequences of religious establishments generated by the
Establishment Clause disability is one of the “immunities” protected by the clause
against state action. Again, historical support remains to be demonstrated,207 but it
hardly distorts the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to include within its
coverage a personal immunity from the effects of religious establishments as the
logical consequence of a disability on federal and state governments to establish
religion.208
3. Logic, Text, and Blaine
The classical anti-incorporationist template plays Blaine as a trump against
Establishment Clause incorporation: if the Establishment Clause had already been

205. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
206. Cf. Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6, at 1130 (arguing that various
Reconstruction-era controversies reflected an evolved understanding of the Establishment
Clause “that stood for personal ‘immunity’ from state establishment of religion”); Lash,
Beyond Incorporation, supra note 134, at 458 (arguing that by the 1860s anti-establishment
norms had evolved into privileges or immunities of citizenship). While I agree with
Professor Lash’s contention that the Establishment Clause entailed this personal immunity at
the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, I contend that it was part of the original
understanding of the Clause, and not the result of interpretative evolution. See supra Part
II.B.1.
207. See infra Part III.
208. Compare “disability” in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
disability as “inability to perform some function,” especially “the inability of one person to
alter a given relation with another person”), with “immunity” in id. at 817–18 (defining
immunity as “exemption from a duty, liability, or service of process”); compare “disability,”
IV OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 713 (2d ed. 1989) (“Want of ability (to discharge any
office or function); inability, incapacity, impotence.”), with “immunity,” VII id. at 691
(“Exemption from a service, obligation, or duty,” including “freedom from liability to
taxation, jurisdiction, etc.” and a “privilege granted to an individual or a corporation
conferring exemption from certain taxes, burdens, or duties.”).
The argument here is purely textual and does not depend on whether the
contemporary meanings of “disability” and “immunity” coincide with their mid-nineteenth
century meanings. Cf. Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note 50, at 1098–131 (developing
pro-incorporation argument based upon original meanings of “privilege” and “immunity”).
This Article sketches a historical argument for Establishment Clause incorporation infra Part
III.
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applied against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, then Congress would not
have bothered to try to re-apply it through Blaine.209
The logical and textual account of Establishment Clause incorporation provides
an account of incorporation that is consistent with Blaine. The portion of the Blaine
Amendment that would have applied the Establishment Clause to the states
specified a state government disability. It contrasted markedly with the general
state disabilities implied by the undifferentiated personal liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause and the unspecified citizen immunities referenced in the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Blaine would only have made explicit the state
disability to create religious establishments, correlative to the personal immunity
from such establishments that are implied by textual references to undifferentiated
“liberty” and unspecified “immunities.”
One need not wonder long why a Reconstruction Congress might have wanted
to expressly protect an immunity or liberty that was already implicitly protected by
an existing Fourteenth Amendment clause. The 1787 anti-Federalists wanted the
same thing, having pushed for a Bill of Rights despite Federalist claims that the
Constitution gave the federal government no power to violate such rights.210 The
Forty-Third Congress may have had similar concerns in mind when it proposed to
expressly apply the Religion Clauses against the states in Blaine, having already
endured crabbed judicial interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment that placed
in question the Freedman’s Bureau and Civil Rights Acts,211 followed by Supreme
Court rejection of the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment had applied all
or most of the Bill of Rights to the states.212 Having witnessed the narrowing of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the evisceration of the Fourteenth by a hostile
judiciary, Blaine proponents argued for an unambiguous, tightly worded
amendment whose very specificity would render it impervious to unsympathetic
judicial constructions.213
* * *
The Blaine Amendment would merely have made explicit the state disability
necessarily linked to the undifferentiated liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause or the unspecified personal immunities protected by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. The proposal of the Blaine Amendment seven years after
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment is thus logically and textually consistent
with prior application of the Establishment Clause to the states through either the
Due Process or Privileges or Immunities Clause.

209. See supra Parts I.B.1.c, I.C.1.
210. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
211. See Richard L. Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the States: The History
and the Future, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 77, 81–85 (2009) [hereinafter Aynes,
Enforcing the Bill of Rights].
212. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
213. E.g., 4 CONG. REC. 5585 (1876) (remarks of Sen. Oliver Morton (R-IN)) (arguing
that in light of the virtual destruction of the Fourteenth Amendment by judicial construction,
the provisions of the Blaine Amendment should be “so specific and so strong that they
cannot be construed away and destroyed by courts”).
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III. INCORPORATION HISTORY IN A LOGICAL AND TEXTUAL FRAME
Fourteenth Amendment history is consistent with Establishment Clause
incorporation when viewed through a logical and textual framework supporting
incorporation. What follows is not a full-fledged originalist defense of
Establishment Clause incorporation, but a historical sketch that illustrates how
different the historical evidence appears when framed by logical and textual
arguments that support incorporation, rather than their opposites. When framed by
the logical and textual bases for incorporation, historical evidence suggests that at
least one widely held understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment included its
application of the Establishment Clause against the states.
In the period immediately preceding the drafting and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, there was both a specific historical context that supported
incorporation as well as references by members of Congress to the need to apply
anti-establishment norms to the states.214 During the framing and ratification of the
Amendment from 1866 to 1868, there were also references to what were then
understood as anti-establishment norms, as well as references to general
incorporation of the Bill of Rights that obviously encompassed the Establishment
Clause.215 Finally, post-ratification statements confirm the temporally prior
evidence that many members of the Civil War and Reconstruction Congresses
intended or understood the Establishment Clause to limit state action upon
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.216 All of this historical evidence calls for
a serious reexamination of Fourteenth Amendment history relating to the question
of Establishment Clause incorporation.217
A. Before the Framing
Among the concerns of the victorious Northern states in the aftermath of the
Civil War were rampant violations of Bill of Rights norms by most slaveholding
states during the antebellum period and by the former Confederate states in the
immediate aftermath of the war,218 when the states were not formally bound by
them.219 These included violations of anti-establishment norms by slaveholding
states.

214. See infra Part III.A.
215. See infra Part III.B.
216. See infra Part III.C.
217. See infra Part III.D.
218. E.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH: “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”
(2000) [hereinafter CURTIS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH] (documenting extensive violations of
freedom of speech in the North and South during antebellum, Civil War, and Reconstruction
eras); Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Referendum of 1866: Andrew Johnson and the
Original Meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 50–56 (University of Illinois
College of Law, Working Paper, 2012) [hereinafter Lash, Referendum of 1866], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2125363. See generally CURTIS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 20,
at 28–56.
219. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). However, many state supreme
courts adopted Bill of Rights norms as a matter of general law despite their not binding the
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Slavery and the Civil War had given rise to sectional theological schisms which
fractured Southern and Northern Protestants over whether their denominational
beliefs legitimated or condemned American slavery.220 Antebellum slave states
came to see white Southern churches as a crucial component of the social order
founded on slavery.221 As conflicts over slavery deepened, therefore, slaveholding
governments dramatically increased their regulation of Southern religion, licensing
only proslavery ministers,222 dictating proslavery theology and doctrine,223 and
generally suppressing—often violently—religious antislavery leadership
(especially in black churches).224 Many Southern churches, for their part, seceded
from antislavery denominations and adopted proslavery theologies to avoid
government regulation and persecution,225 though also out of genuine conviction.226
states as a matter of federal constitutional law. See generally Jason Mazzone, The Bill of
Rights in Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2007).
220. See MARK NOLL, THE CIVIL WAR AS A THEOLOGICAL CRISIS (2006); see, e.g., LINDA
PRZYBYSZEWSKI, RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 17 (2011) (“The
dispute over the morality of slavery as a legal institution was rooted in opposing visions of
the natural rights and natural capacities of African Americans.”); DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH
OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 76 (2011) (“Northern establishmentarians began to
question slavery, and Southern establishmentarians began to see it as a linchpin to a moral
society.”).
221. See SEHAT, supra note 220, at 76, 80; see also CLEMENT EATON, THE FREEDOM OF
THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH 292–93 (1951) (describing how Christian clerics in the
antebellum South formulated “a plausible defense of slavery” by use of a “narrow and literal
interpretation of the Scriptures”).
222. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not, supra note 6, at 1317; Aynes, McDonald, supra note 6, at
190.
223. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not, supra note 6, at 1317 (noting that antebellum slave-holding
states tightly regulated “the content of religious doctrine presented to parishioners”); cf.
Richard Albert, Beyond the Conventional Establishment Clause Narrative, 28 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 329, 356–63 (2005) (describing Frederick Douglass’s view that proslavery ideology
corrupted American Evangelical Christianity in the slave-holding states).
224. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 163 (2007) (noting that the Vesey slave-rebellion conspiracy
generated “tighter security measures,” including “stricter limitations on black religious
gatherings”); Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6, at 1137–39 (noting that “[b]lack
religious assemblies were heavily regulated; slaves were not permitted their own ministers,
nor could they worship without the presence of a white man”); Lash, Free Exercise, supra
note 134, at 1133–34 (What emerged in the slave-holding states after the Nat Turner
rebellion “was a complex and highly regulated system of religious exercise.”); see also ERIC
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 78–79, 88 (1988) (The end of slavery also brought an end to
“white supervision” of black churches.); HOWE, supra, at 183 (“Friend and foe alike
recognized the free black churches as bastions of opposition to slavery and havens for those
escaping from it.”).
225. See HOWE, supra note 224, at 478 (“[S]outhern evangelicals gradually made their
peace with their section’s ‘peculiar institution’ as the price for continuing undisturbed with
their preaching and voluntary activities.”); Aynes, McDonald, supra note 6, at 189–90
(“[S]everal national churches split into northern and southern branches when the southern
members seceded in order to maintain an ‘established’ church that would support slavery.”);
e.g., HOWE, supra note 224, at 478–79 (describing splits over slavery in Methodist and
Presbyterian denominations).
226. JOHN PATRICK DALY, WHEN SLAVERY WAS CALLED FREEDOM: EVANGELICALISM,
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Whatever their motivations, Southern Protestant churches became enthusiastic
and indispensable supporters of state slaveholding regimes. “By 1860,” Professor
Lash concludes, “the South had erected the most comprehensive religious
establishment to exist on American soil since Massachusetts Bay,”227 an
arrangement that persisted beyond the Civil War and ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment.228
As the Civil War drew to a close, dismantling the Southern establishment of
proslavery Christianity became a congressional goal.229 Some members of
Congress expressly articulated their support. In an 1864 speech arguing for the
abolition of slavery by constitutional amendment, Rep. James Wilson (R-Iowa)
quoted the First Amendment in full and then excoriated slave states for violating
each of its provisions.230 He took clear aim at the Southern establishment of
proslavery Christianity, criticizing slave-state laws and practices that permitted
churches to operate only on condition that they taught exclusively proslavery
theology:

PROSLAVERY, AND THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR 2, 3 (2002) (Southerners believed that
“slavery had arisen in keeping with the ‘genius of the age.’”); PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note
220, at 18 (“Defenders of the southern laws of slavery . . . [argued] that God approved of the
peculiar institution as a benefit to the inferior African race.”); SEHAT, supra note 220, at 79
(“Southern moral establishmentarians claimed that Christian slavery was a system of
governance that was appropriate for slaves.”).
227. Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6, at 1137; see also EATON, supra note 221,
at 292 (“The growing need of defending the institution of slavery . . . tended to produce
religious uniformity in the South.”).
228. E.g., Joint Comm. on Reconstr., 39th Cong., 1st Sess., Rep. No. 30 (Va., N.C.,
S.C.), at 52–53 (1866) (testimony regarding refusal of postwar Virginia county to license
black minister to perform marriages); id. (Fla., La., Tex.), at 79 (testimony regarding refusal
of postwar New Orleans police to allow black church meetings after 9:00 p.m.); see DALY,
supra note 226, at 152 (“Proslavery ideology lived on in a world without slavery, much as
the defense of the Confederate cause went on in a world without a Confederacy.”); FONER,
supra note 224, at 89 (“The end of slavery does not appear to have altered the views of many
white clergymen as to the legitimacy of the peculiar institution or the desirability of
preserving unaltered blacks’ second-class status within biracial churches. The ‘whole
doctrine’ of the scriptural justification for slavery remained intact . . . .”); PRZYBYSZEWSKI,
supra note 220, at 19 (“Military defeat did not discourage white southerners from identifying
white supremacy with the divine order.”); SEHAT, supra note 220, at 114–15 (suggesting that
white southern control of black churches was an important aspect of the post-Amendment
black codes); id. at 117 (noting postwar white southern view that the combination of African
and Christian beliefs among the newly freed slaves required that “religious retraining . . . be
a fundamental task for schools”).
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction took extensive testimony on the persistence
of denominational schisms throughout the postwar South, as well as social ostracism and
violent attacks directed at clerics from the North or associated with northern Protestant
denominations. E.g., Joint Comm. on Reconstr., supra, (Tenn.), at 93; id. (Va., N.C., S.C.),
at 38–39, 45–46, 53, 63, 88–90, 149–50, 167, 170, 173–75; id. (Fla., La., Tex.), at 67.
229. See Aynes, Ink Blot or Not, supra note 6, at 1317; Lash, Establishment Clause,
supra note 6, at 1089; Lash, Free Exercise, supra note 134, at 1133–34.
230. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202–03 (1864).
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The bitter cruel, relentless persecutions of the Methodists in the
South . . . tell how utterly slavery disregards the right to a free exercise
of religion. No religion which recognizes God’s eternal attribute of
justice and breaths that spirit of love which applies to all men . . . can
ever be allowed free exercise where slavery curses men and defies God.
No religious denomination can flourish or even be tolerated where
slavery rules without surrendering the choicest jewels of its faith into
the keeping of that infidel power which withholds the Bible from the
poor. Religion, “consisting in the performance of all known duties to
God and our fellow-men,” never has been and never will be allowed
free exercise in any community where slavery dwarfs the consciences
of men.231
Also in 1864 Rep. John Farnsworth (R-IL) similarly accused “the slave power” of
having taken “possession of the churches.”232
Some anti-incorporationists try to blunt this evidence by arguing that
slaveholding-state regulation of religion violated free exercise rather than antiestablishment norms, and thus tells us nothing about the original intentions or
understandings relating to application of the Establishment Clause to the states.233
As Professor Lash has pointed out, however, this reflects a “presentist” bias that
projects contemporary understandings of the Religion Clauses into the past.234
Throughout the nineteenth century, “the general understanding was that any law
which supported or suppressed religion as religion violated the nonestablishment
principle that government has no power over religion as such.”235 At the very least,
one may reasonably conclude that slave-state action to promote proslavery
Christianity violated both free exercise and anti-establishment norms236 and that the
concern of members of the Reconstruction Congresses to eliminate this practice
reflected an intention to apply both norms to the states.237

231. Id. at 1202.
232. Id. at 2979 (“[T]he slave power got the control of the Government, of the executive,
legislative, and judicial departments. Then it was that they got possession of the high places
of society. They took possession of the churches. They took possession of the lands. Then it
became criminal for a man to open his lips in denunciation of the evil and sin of
slaveholding.”).
233. See, e.g., supra Part I.C.2.
234. Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6, at 1140 (noting the “common (modern)
tendency” of viewing the Establishment Clause as a constitutional prohibition on
government support for religion, and the Free Exercise Clause as the source of protection of
religious worship).
235. Id. at 1140–41 (emphasis omitted).
236. See Feldman, supra note 71, at 403 & n.321.
237. See Lash, Two Movements, supra note 130, at 495 (“Even when Reconstruction
Republicans did not quote the Establishment Clause, they often used words or phrases that
arguably could include both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.”).

714

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:669

B. Framing and Ratification
The drafting and ratification history of the Fourteenth Amendment also yields
references to the application of anti-establishment norms to the states, especially
after adjusting for presentist bias.238 Equally as important are statements by
important framers of the Fourteenth Amendment that did not specifically reference
anti-establishment norms, but which showed their understanding that the
Amendment applied the entirety of the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights
to the states.239
1. Anti-Establishment References
In 1866, after the Fourteenth Amendment had been reported by Congress to the
states for ratification, Rep. John Bingham (R-Ohio) announced as a theme of his
reelection campaign: “We do not ally the church and the State” in the United
States.240 In an address to Congress after the Republican victory in the 1866
elections, President Johnson similarly invoked the separation of church and state as
one of the virtues of Republican government to have been affirmed by the Northern
victory.241
In addition to these express invocations of anti-establishment norms, there are
references to “conscience” during the ratification debates.242 Today rights of
conscience are associated with free exercise norms, but they were once closely
associated with disestablishment.243 Noah Feldman in particular has persuasively
argued that eighteenth-century Americans understood religious “assessments”—
that is, taxes levied to support an established church—as violations of the “liberty
of conscience” despite the fact that they did not prohibit worship by religious
dissenters in their own tradition; the mere fact that the State required one to
financially support a religion in which he or she did not believe constituted the
violation.244 Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance is notable for its argument
that even the relatively mild Virginia assessment bill, which would have allowed
taxpayers to direct their assessments to the religion of their choice or even just to

238. See infra Part III.B.1.
239. See infra Part III.B.2.
240. See Aynes, Ink Blot or Not, supra note 6, at 1318 (quoting Eloquent Speech of John
A. Bingham, THE CADIZ REPUBLICAN, Aug. 15, 1866, at 2 (reporting Bingham’s nomination
address for the Cincinnati Gazette)).
241. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 1, 5 (1866) (“Here religion, released from
political connection with the civil government, refuses to subserve the craft of the statesman,
and becomes, in its independence, the spiritual life of the people.”). But see Lash,
Referendum of 1866, supra note 218 , at 5 (noting that Johnson opposed ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
242. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866) (Rep. Bingham, referring
to the Fourteenth Amendment as a protection for “equal personal rights” including “freedom
of conscience”); id. at 237 (Rep. John Kasson (R-IA), speaking of the right of suffrage as a
“natural right” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, like “personal liberty” and “the
right of exercising personal conscience”).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 110–11.
244. Feldman, supra note 71, at 398–405.
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public education, violated one’s liberty of religious conscience.245 Disestablishment
eliminated religious assessments, and thus protected religious conscience.246 This
association of anti-establishment norms with the protection of religious conscience
was still common in the mid-nineteenth century.247
2. General Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
As late as the 1980s, the entrenched constitutional wisdom among legal
academics was that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply the Bill of Rights to
the states.248 At most, the Amendment was thought to have applied to the states
only certain natural or customary rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,”
which overlapped a few provisions of the Bill of Rights.249
Professor Curtis’s No State Shall Abridge was the first major attack on the
conventional anti-incorporationist wisdom since William Crosskey’s reply to
Fairman’s brief for Justice Frankfurter.250 Whether, how, and to what extent the
Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states has since been
extensively explored by Curtis and other incorporationists.251 Due largely to their
work, originalist evidence for incorporation of the entire Bill of Rights is now so
well developed that it has dissolved the conventional wisdom,252 although some
contemporary scholars still contest general incorporation.253

245. See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in
8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 298–304 (Robert A. Rutland, William M.E. Rachal,
Barbara D. Ripel & Fredrika J. Teute eds., 1973) (June 20, 1785).
246. Feldman, supra note 71, at 399 (“The primary reason not to have an established
religion . . . was the protection of liberty of conscience of dissenters.”).
247. See Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6, at 1141.
248. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 134–56 (1979) (arguing that
the Fourteenth Amendment was not understood to have applied any portion of the Bill of
Rights to the states); NELSON, supra note 123, at 117–19 (arguing that the Amendment was
understood only to require equality of and due process in enforcement of fundamental and
other rights the people enjoy under state law).
249. This was Fairman’s conclusion. See Fairman, supra note 67, at 139; see also EARL
MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS 117–18 (1990); JACOBUS
TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 223 (1951).
250. See William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the
Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954); see also supra
note 67.
251. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 4; CURTIS, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 218;
MALTZ, supra note 249; Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Rights, supra note 211; Richard L.
Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57
(1993) [hereinafter Aynes, John Bingham]; Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the
States: An Overview from One Perspective, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 4–11 (2009);
James Jay Ward, The Original Public Understanding of Privileges or Immunities, 2011 BYU
L. REV. 445; Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights, supra note 20; Bryan H.
Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and
Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1051 (2000).
252. See, e.g., MALTZ, supra note 249, at 117–18 (stating that although the Fourteenth
Amendment’s application of the Bill of Rights is “not proven beyond a reasonable
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Establishment Clause incorporation obviously draws support from the historical
argument for general incorporation. Two of the central figures in the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Representative Bingham and Senator Jacob Howard (RMich.), unambiguously expressed their understanding that it applied the entirety of
the Bill of Rights to the states during congressional debates on whether to approve
and report the Amendment to the states.
a. John Bingham
Representative Bingham was a pivotal figure in the congressional drafting and
approval of the Amendment, having been a member of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, the principal author of Section 1 of the Amendment, and a critical
supporter of the Amendment in the House.254 An early version of Section 1
proposed by Bingham would have provided Congress with the power to
legislatively enforce the rights guaranteed by Article IV and the Fifth
Amendment.255 The proposal did not contain a self-executing enumeration of such
rights, however, because Bingham, like many other Reconstruction Republicans,256
believed that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV already imposed
the Bill of Rights and unenumerated natural and customary rights on the states.257
In Bingham’s mind, the constitutional deficiency was lack of a federal enforcement
mechanism for Article IV rights; state officials were constitutionally obligated by
their oaths of office to protect these rights, but no provision of the Constitution
doubt[,] . . . one can only conclude that contemporaries must have understood the privileges
and immunities clause to embody most of the Bill of Rights, and they probably viewed the
first eight amendments as incorporated in their entirety”); Aynes, John Bingham, supra note
251, at 103 (stating that “Bingham’s view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies the Bill of Rights to the states” was shared by “[m]any of his
contemporaries,” including “three highly-regarded legal treatise writers”); Aynes, Ink Blot or
Not, supra note 6, at 1309 (“Though the full extent of the contours of the [Privileges or
Immunities] Clause is subject to interpretation, there should be no controversy that, at the
core, these provisions included the Bill of Rights.”); Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of
Rights, supra note 20, at 1626 (concluding that evidence from 1886–67 “seems sufficient to
support the inference that it nationalized the Bill of Rights.”).
253. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATES 434–76 (2002);
NELSON, supra note 123, at 117–19. See generally Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of
Rights, supra note 20, at 1520–25 (surveying anti-incorporation views of contemporary
scholars).
254. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights, supra note 20, at 1532.
255. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (“The Congress shall have power
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States [Art. 4, Sec. 2], and to all
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property [5th
Amendment].”).
256. See, e.g., CURTIS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 51–52; Alfred Avins,
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1, 5–6, 10–11 (1968); Aynes, John Bingham, supra note 251, at 74, 78–80.
257. CURTIS, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 61–64; MALTZ, supra note 249, at
115; Aynes, John Bingham, supra note 251, at 74–75; Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes
Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALLYSIS
165, 248–50 (2011); Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights, supra note 20, at 1569.

2013]

INCORPORATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

717

empowered the federal government to enforce them. As Bingham explained in
describing the need for this amendment, “[I]t is equally clear by every construction
of the Constitution . . . legislative, executive, and judicial, these great provisions of
the Constitution, this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution, rested
for its execution and enforcement hitherto upon the fidelity of the States.”258 Later
on in the debate, when confronted with the (erroneous) argument that the Bill of
Rights was already enforceable by the federal government against the states,
Bingham made clear both the constitutional need and his intention to empower
Congress to enforce the Bill of Rights against contrary state action:
A gentleman on the other side . . . wanted to know if I could cite a
decision showing that the power of the Federal Government to enforce
in the United States courts the bill of rights under the articles of
amendment to the Constitution had been denied. I answer that I was
prepared to introduce such decisions; and that is exactly what makes
plain the necessity of adopting this amendment.259
Whether the idiosyncrasy of “Article IV incorporation” was coherent and
defensible is not as important as Bingham’s clear and repeated statements about the
need to give Congress power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states.260
Some months later in the drafting process, Bingham proposed the self-executing
rights language that (with the addition of the Citizenship Clause) was ultimately
ratified as section 1 of the Amendment.261 Bingham’s comments on this version of
the Amendment also exhibited his understanding that it applied the Bill of Rights to

258. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866); accord id. at 1291
(“[E]nforcement of the bill of rights is the want of the Republic.”); Aynes, Enforcing the Bill
of Rights, supra note 211, at 86 (“This was simply a proposition to arm the Congress of the
United States . . . with power to enforce the Bill of Rights as it stood in the Constitution.”)
(quoting Washington News, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1866, at 5); id. at 125 (describing widely
circulated 1866 pamphlet authored by Bingham entitled “In support of the proposed
amendment to enforce the Bill of Rights”); see Avins, supra note 256, at 5–6; Aynes, John
Bingham, supra note 251, at 67; Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights, supra note 20,
at 1539.
259. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089–91 (1866) (referring to Barron v.
Baltimore, 35 U.S. 243 (1833), and Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469 (1833)); see
also MALTZ, supra note 249, at 115; Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights, supra note
20, at 1540–41.
260. See MALTZ, supra note 249, at 115 (concluding on the basis of Bingham’s remarks
that he “saw the Bill of Rights as included within the concept of privileges and immunities”).
261. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (“No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
deny to any person with the jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws.”). Another
provision gave Congress power to enforce the rights guaranteed by this language. CURTIS,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 85.
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the states.262 Bingham similarly confirmed this understanding in a House debate in
1867 after the Amendment had been reported to the states for ratification.263
b. Jacob Howard
Like Bingham, Senator Howard was a member of the joint committee. He also
acted as floor manager for the Amendment when it was debated and approved by
the Senate.264 Howard’s understanding that the Amendment applied the Bill of
Rights to the states was unmistakably set forth in his introduction of the
Amendment to the Senate. In explicating the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
after giving a preliminary definition of the “privileges and immunities of
citizenship” based on the exemplars listed by Justice Washington in Corfield v.
Coryell,265 Howard flatly declared: “To these privileges and immunities . . . should
be added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments
of the Constitution,” giving as examples the freedoms of speech, press, petition,
and assembly; the rights to bear arms, to be informed of criminal charges, and to
jury trial; and the rights against mandatory quartering of soldiers in one’s home,
unreasonable searches and seizures, excessive bail, and cruel and unusual
punishments.266
* * *
As Earl Maltz has concluded, “one cannot plausibly argue that Howard and
Bingham did not believe the Bill of Rights to be fully incorporated” against the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment.267 No one in the House or the Senate disputed
Bingham’s and Howard’s respective declarations that Section 1 applied the first
eight amendments of the Bill of Rights to the states,268 and their arguments in this
regard were widely understood and reported in the popular press.269 If the general
incorporation thesis is correct, and there is a logical and textual basis for
incorporating the Establishment Clause, then there is no reason to think that
undisputed incorporation references to the “bill of rights” or “first eight
amendments” by prominent members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress did not include
the Establishment Clause, even in the absence of specific mention of what today
would be understood as anti-establishment norms.

262. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (arguing that the Amendment
would halt violations of the Eighth Amendment that were then common among the states).
263. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 811 (1867) (arguing that the Amendment would
empower Congress to enforce “all the limitations for personal protection of every article and
section of the Constitution”).
264. See Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights, supra note 20, at 1532.
265. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
266. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765–66 (1866). Howard introduced this
enumeration with the phrase “such as” and thus expressly framed it as nonexhaustive. See
Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights, supra note 20, at 1561. It is thus of no moment
that he did not expressly cite either of the Religion Clauses.
267. MALTZ, supra note 249, at 115.
268. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights, supra note 20, at 1568, 1583–84 &
n.248.
269. Lash, Referendum of 1866, supra note 218, at 16, 26, 32.
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C. After Ratification
Support for Establishment Clause incorporation is evident in expressions by
members of Congress and other federal officials in the aftermath of ratification. In
the 1871 debates about the Ku Klux Klan Act, Bingham himself unambiguously
stated that the “privileges and immunities of citizens” protected against state
encroachment by the Fourteenth Amendment are “chiefly defined in the first eight
amendments to the Constitution,” whereupon he quoted those amendments,
including the Establishment Clause, word for word.270 In 1874, Senator Thomas
Norwood (D-GA) rejected the view that the Fourteenth Amendment had not
conferred “new privileges and immunities” of citizenship, observing that “[b]efore
its adoption any State might have established a particular religion” and violated all
the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, but no longer: “[T]he instant the
fourteenth amendment became a part of the Constitution,” Norwood concluded,
“every State was that moment disabled from making or enforcing any law which
would deprive any citizen of a State of the benefits enjoyed by citizens of the
United States under the first eight amendments to the Constitution.”271 Finally,
many lower federal courts, federal prosecutors, practicing lawyers, and individual
Supreme Court Justices assumed in the wake of ratification that the Fourteenth
Amendment had applied the Bill of Rights to the states.272
* * *
The Fourteenth Amendment was drafted and ratified against a background that
included, among many other things, a desire on the part of at least some members
of Congress to dismantle the proslavery Christian establishment created by the
slaveholding states. Debates during the drafting of the Amendment included
references to religious “conscience,” then associated at least as much with antiestablishment norms as with free exercise norms. Additionally, Rep. Bingham and
Sen. Howard, two of the most important framers and supporters of the Amendment,
clearly understood the Amendment to apply the entirety of the first eight
amendments of the Constitution to the states. Finally, while the Amendment was
before the states for ratification, Bingham himself ran for reelection on his belief
that the Amendment applied anti-establishment norms to the states, making specific
reference to preventing the alliance of church and state, and in the years
immediately following ratification, Bingham and others indicated their belief that
the Amendment had applied anti-establishment norms against the states.

270. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong, 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871).
[T]hat the scope and meaning of the limitations imposed by the first section,
fourteenth amendment of the Constitution may be more fully understood,
permit me to say that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the
first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Those eight
amendments are as follows: [Exact recitation of Amendments I through VIII.]
Id.
271. 2 CONG. REC. app. 233, 242 (1874). All issues of the Congressional Record are
available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwcrlink. html#anchor42.
272. See R. SMITH, supra note 91, at 161; Avins, supra note 256, at 8–9; Aynes,
Enforcing the Bill of Rights, supra note 211, at 98–99 & n.115.
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Combined with the logical and textual basis for Establishment Clause
incorporation, this history presents a plausible case for an original understanding
that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Establishment Clause to the states.
D. Serious History
There is, unsurprisingly, historical evidence that weighs against incorporation.
For example, in a diversity case handed down in 1871—well before SlaughterHouse (1873), Walker (1876), and Cruikshank (1876) made clear the Supreme
Court’s rejection of incorporation—the Court applied the general common law
prohibition on theological entanglement without any mention of the Establishment
Clause, suggesting the Court’s belief that the anti-entanglement norm did not apply
to the states as a matter of federal constitutional law despite its resonance with the
Establishment Clause.273 Many Blaine-like amendments that would have applied
the religion clauses to the states were proposed in Congress after ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment but well before Slaughter-House, Walker, and Cruikshank
had rendered incorporation a doctrinal dead letter.274 Although many lawyers and
judges assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment had applied the Bill of Rights to
the states,275 others assumed the opposite.276 None of these developments would
have been expected from a Congress, a federal judiciary, or a practicing bar that
understood the Fourteenth Amendment to have applied the Establishment Clause
against the states in 1868. A careful examination of antebellum and
Reconstruction-era history would doubtless uncover additional anti-incorporation
evidence to be weighed against the pro-incorporation evidence sketched above and
present elsewhere in the historical record.277
To date, however, only Professor Lash has considered Establishment Clause
incorporation based on the entire historical record, and he did so on the premise
that incorporation of the original meaning of the clause was neither logical nor
textual.278 Lash’s work also predates much of the pro-incorporationist scholarship
that has so firmly established the general incorporationist position.279
Given the logical and textual accounts of Establishment Clause incorporation, it
is no longer sufficient to cite Blaine as if it single-handedly demolishes any
originalist case for incorporation. It is far past time for a comprehensive
reexamination of historical evidence on the question whether the Fourteenth
Amendment was generally understood to have applied the Establishment Clause to
the states at the time it was ratified.

273. Compare supra note 94 and accompanying text (summarizing anti-incorporation
holdings of these decisions), with Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). See also
HOWE, supra note 194, at 76–85.
274. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 253, at 437–38 & n.115; O’NEIL, supra note 3, at
158–60.
275. See supra text accompanying note 271.
276. Avins, supra note 256, at 8, 10.
277. See supra Part III.A–C.
278. See supra notes 128–37 and accompanying text.
279. See, e.g., supra note 251.
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CONCLUSION
Anti-incorporationists find Establishment Clause incorporation an inexhaustible
source of amusement.280 But the laughter is premature: there are logical, textual,
and historical accounts of Establishment Clause incorporation, notwithstanding its
eighteenth-century origins as a purely structural provision of the Constitution.
Structural constitutional provisions are disabilities that are logically linked with
immunities.281 As a structural provision originally disabling Congress from passing
laws relating to religious establishments, the Clause immunized the states against
the consequences of resisting federal interference in state decisions about religious
establishment and disestablishment, but also immunized the people from the
consequences of resisting encroachments on their personal liberty by a
congressionally established religion.282
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the United States expanded federal power at
the expense of the states with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and
other Reconstruction amendments. With respect to the Establishment Clause, this
expansion eliminated the state immunity against federal interference in state
religious establishments and expanded the personal immunity to immunize
individuals from the consequences of state as well as federal religious
establishments.283
There is nothing illogical about expanding a personal immunity from the
consequences of federally established religion to include state action that seeks to
establish religion. Nor is there anything textually strange about characterizing a
personal immunity from the consequences of government-established religion as a
dimension of the personal “liberty” protected against state action by the Due
Process Clause or as an “immunity of citizenship” protected against such action by
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.284 There is historical evidence that members
of the Reconstruction Congress intended and understood the Fourteenth
Amendment to have precisely the effect of imposing anti-establishment norms on
the states.285 The Blaine Amendment, finally, can be logically, textually, and
historically understood as a congressional attempt to counter the Supreme Court’s
evisceration of the Fourteenth Amendment by expressly placing the personal
immunity against government-established religion under federal protection and
enforcement.286
It takes extraordinary self-assurance to make fun of one’s opponents as
laughably wrong. Sometimes the laughs are warranted.287 But sometimes they
merely disguise the frailty of conventional wisdom—which, after all, owes its

280. See supra notes 10, 190, 194 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Part II.A.
282. See supra Part II.B.
283. See supra Part II.C.1.
284. See supra Part II.C.2.
285. See supra Part III.
286. See supra Part II.C.3.
287. See e.g., DR. ORLY TAITZ, ESQUIRE, http://www.orlytaitzesq.com (arguing that
President Obama is not a natural-born citizen); The Lack of Natural Born Citizen Status of
Barack Hussein Obama, II, THE BIRTHERS, http://www.birthers.org (same).
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status largely to familiarity and acceptability.288 That would seem to be the case
here, where the supposed illogic, textual infidelity, and ahistoricity of
Establishment Clause incorporation seem to have been established as much by
repetition as by analysis and research.289
The Supreme Court’s decision to apply the Establishment Clause against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment proved to be a crucial moment in
American constitutional history, and its delegitimation and potential reversal raise
immense constitutional stakes. The issue warrants more serious consideration and
investigation than it has received.

288. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 9 (1958).
289. See supra Part I.B–C.

